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Independence After Matsqui?
Richard Haigh* and Jim Smith**
The authors look at the Supreme Court's latest fully reasoned decision on
independence in Canadian Pacific v. Matsqui, where native tribunals were found to be
biased because of certain institutional characteristics. The authors argue that the
court employs, on the one hand, a \'ery simplified analysis of independence, but at the
same time, sets standards for testing independence and bias in tribunals that are
impossible to adequately quantify in practice. Neither the reasoning of Lamer C.J, nor
Sopinka J. is adequate to address the full range of tribunal experience; in fact, the
Supreme Court examines administrative tribunals as if they were simply smaller
courts, without recognizing their inhere/If differences. Subsequent cases on this point
have failed to take into accou/lf the differences in these opinions. The authors
conclude by noting the complexity of issues regarding bias, such as institutional
independence, and question the direction of Canadian jurfaprudence in this area.

Les auteurs examinent I' arrl!t le plus recent de la Cour supreme du Canada en
matiere d' independance judiciaire, !' arrf!t Canadien Pacifique c. Matsqui, clans lequel
on a juge que des tribunaux aborigenes eraient partiaux en raison de certaines
caracteristiques institutionnelles. Les auteurs soumettent que la Cour a, d' 1111 cote, eu
recours a une analyse simplifiee du concept d' independance, tout en erablissant du
meme soujfle des criteres pour evaluer l'independance et la partialite des tribunaux,
criteres s' averant impossible a quantifier correctement dans la pratique. Ni I' opinion
de Lamer, J.C.C., ni ce!le de Sopinka, J., n' arrive a poser correctement la question du
vaste champ d' expertise du tribunal administratif; en fair, la Cour supreme examine
!es tribunaux administratifs comme s' ii s' agissait simplement de plus petits tribunaux,
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sans reconnaftre leurs particularites inherentes. Des opinions rendues dans des
affaires subsequentes porta/lf sur le meme point ont omis de prendre ces differences en
consideration. Les auteurs concluent en 110tant la complexite des questions relatives a
la partialite, telle celle de!' independance judiciaire, et s' interrogent sur l' orientation
qu' a pris la jurisprudence canadienne dans ce domaine.

1. INTRODUCTION
Finding the right balance between independence and
responsibility in democratic institutions is tricky. The independent
spirit, praised as a personal quality, is carried over into our political
institutions, but is tempered by a need for accountability, through such
cornerstones as the separation of powers, the rule of law and
independence of the judiciary. 1 These ideas continue in our
administrative tribunals. We want our tribunals to be independent in
order to imbue them with court-like legitimacy. 2 But this
independence is never absolute. Thus, depending on such factors as
the nature of the tribunal, the form of decision-making power and the
importance of the dispute to be resolved, independence may be
restricted. Optimizing the operating conditions for administrative
tribunals is, therefore, a constant governmental pastime. 3
Probably no one is cited more on this point than A.V. Dicey, whose views on
Parliamentary sovereignty, rule of law, and limited separation of powers are still
accepted in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. See An Introduction to the Study of
the law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: MacMillan Press, 1965).
See, for example, H.N. Janisch, "Independence of Administrative Tribunals: In
Praise of 'Structural Heretics"' (1987-88) l C.J.A.L.P. lat 1-2.
See the points raised by M. Rankin, "Adjudication, Independence and
Responsibility: The Delicate Balance" (1991) 2 Tribune (CCAT) 18 at 18, 21; see
also A. Lamer, "The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core
Values in Times of Change," (1996) 45 U.N.B.L.J. 3 [1996 Ivan C. Rand
Memorial Lecture, University of New Brunswick]. Even the judiciary may be
subject to economic controls on its independence if some commentators have
their way. Albertan W. Renke, for example, argues in Invoking Independence:
Judicial Independence as a No-cut Wage Guarantee (Points of View Number 5)
(Calgary: Centre for Constitutional Studies, 1994) that the judiciary must not be
exempted from the Canadian people's across-the-board economic sacrifice. In
Provincial Court Judge Assn. (Manitoba) v. Manotoba (Minister of Justice)
(1997), 46 C.R.R. (2d) 1, the S.C.C. holds that Provincial Court judges, as
judges, are independent, and protected by s. l l(d) of the Charter. Interestingly,
Lamer C.J. 's lead judgment refers to the same core characteristics of judicial
independence (security of tenure, financial security and administrative
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Debate, both academic and judicial, concerning the
appropriate level of independence required by administrative tribunals
4
has gone on for decades. More recently, attention has shifted from
individual member independence, to a tentative exploration of the
concept of "institutional independence." The idea has merit, as it
recognizes systemic influences on decision-making. But any fullyelaborated position on institutional independence will have to fulfil
two tasks. First, it will have to provide a rational basis for the concept
itself. Second, it should clearly set out the concept's distinguishing
characteristics. It is of more than passing interest that the courts
themselves will be the final arbiters of whatever standard judicialized or dejudicialized - arises.
This paper is divided into three main parts. The first part is a
brief sketch of the recent history and general context in which any
consideration of tribunal independence must take place. In the second
part, the case of Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band 5 is
introduced. An overview of the reasoning of Lamer C.J. and Sopinka
J. follows, each of whom provides extensive (albeit obiter)
consideration of the institutional independence of administrative
tribunals. The third part is a more critical analysis of the judgment,
using Lamer C.J.'s reasoning as a jumping off point and then
exploring the application of Matsqui in two subsequent cases on bias.
The conclusion that follows outlines certain problems unresolved by
the case, and suggests appropriate directions for the future.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL INDEPENDENCE
IN A NUTSHELL
Unlike some areas of administrative law, in which the
theoretical literature and the cases experience significant interplay,6
independence) and the two dimensions of individual independence and
institutional independence. The judgment arrived too late to be included in this
article.
See, generally, Part 2 of this paper.
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 3, 122 D.L.R. (4th) 129, 26 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, [1995] 2
C.N.L.R. 92, 177 N.R. 325 [hereinafter Matsqui, cited to Admin L.R. in the body
of the text].
Such as in the areas of standard of review or jurisdiction, in which it is quite
likely to find academic writing cited as authority in cases, and the theoretical
writings often centred around a single or set of cases.
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academic and judicial considerations of independence seem to have
developed along two somewhat distinct lines. While the literature
concerns itself primarily with optimizing agency organization and
function within a matrix of administrative agencies serving
adjudicative, policymaking or mixed functions, the moderate number
of cases considering tribunal independence do so based on a small,
tentative set of criteria. These criteria are painstakingly teased out
from either or both of the administrative law test for reasonable
apprehension of bias, and concepts gathered from judicial
independence.
The courts have held independence and impartiality to be
separate and distinct values or requirements. Tribunal impartiality is
determined by the "state of mind" of the decision-maker whereas
independence is a matter of the status of the tribunal which extends
beyond the subjective attitude of the decision-maker. But the concern
with status is generally looked at in respect of three factors - amount
of remuneration, security of tenure for appointed members and degree
of control over the appointment process. 7
In contrast, a wealth of commissions, committees, task forces,
working groups and occasional papers published in academic journals,
have analyzed the issue of administrative tribunal bias differently.
These studies have been extensively canvassed by Robert Macaulay
and James Sprague in their three-volume Practice and Procedure
8
Before Administrative Tribunals, and by Margot Priest, in her paper
delivered at the 1992 Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lecture
9
series. Priest's survey shows that institutional independence is
discussed in a number of reports. JO

The classic test for reasonable apprehension of bias was laid out by de Grandpre
J. in Committee for Justice & Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), infra
note 66. See discussion regarding Matsqui, infra at Part 3(c), for a full review of
these principles.

Certain informal conclusions about the relative importance of
various factors may be drawn from these reports and studies. In areas
bearing on independence, much attention has been directed to the
tenure and appointment process, 11 with far less attention to
remuneration. Administrative control is recognized as important, as is
the need for separate supervisory, recruitment and disciplinary bodies
and the training for members of tribunals. Finally, the continuing
problem of patronage appointments is addressed through growing
recognition that the process of appointment may need complete
reassessment. To date, few, if any, of the recommendations have been
acted upon.
3. CANADIAN PACIFIC LTD. v. MATSQUI INDIAN BAND
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Matsqui, 12 explores the issue
of independence of administrative tribunals in some depth. What the
opining justices arguably deliver are two irreconcilable approaches to
the question: one which advises abstract formalism; the other which
advises a more pragmatic approach but provides little in the way of
new insight.

(a) History of the Case
The question giving rise to the case was a deceptively simple
one. Was Canadian Pacific Limited [hereinafter C.P.], obliged, before
applying for judicial review, to avail itself of the appeal processes
established by a number of First Nation bands under the Indian Ad 3 in
order to question the jurisdiction of those bands to assess property
taxes against them? The case was first heard at the Federal Court,

Lambert Commission (at 16), the Nielsen Task Force on Agencies Study Team
(at 23), the Ouellette Report (at 36), the Macaulay study Directions (at 31-34)
and the Ratushny Report (24-26), amongst others.

R.W. Macaulay & J.L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure Before Administrative
Tribunals, 3 volumes (Toronto: Carswell, 1988).
M.D. Priest, "Structure and Accountability of Administrative Agencies" in Law
Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada
1992: Administrative Law: Principles, Practice and Pluralism (Toronto:
Carswell, 1993) 11.
IO

Priest, ibid, provides a comprehensive list of studies related to administrative
independence. See for example, from Priest, the Glassco Commission (at 15), the
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13

Though the studies might often speak of overwhelming problems rationalizing
patronage and secrecy in appointments, their recommendations most often use
this more fastidious term.
Supra note 5.

Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, as amended by R.S.C. 1985, c. 17 (4th Supp.).
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Trial Division. In striking C.P.'s application for judicial review,
Joyal J. accepted the argument of the Matsqui Indian Band that their
a~sessment by-laws, in providing for a right of appeal to an appeal
tribunal and the Federal Court, Trial Division, were an adequate
alternative remedy . 15
16
C.P. appealed this decision to the Federal Court of Appeal.
Speaking for a unanimous panel, Pratte J.A. allowed the appeal on
jurisdictional grounds, based on errors made by Joyal J. below. These
four e1TOrs were: (I) questions of statutory interpretation relating to
the accuracy of C.P.'s title to land and what flows therefrom were
beyond the jurisdiction of the native appeal tribunals; (2) irrelevant
policy considerations concerning the importance of native self
government were relied upon; (3) the tribunal lacked experience in
conducting a trial; and (4) creating an eventual appeal to the Federal
Court was ultra vires all of the native bands. The purely procedural
qu.estion of whether the Federal Court of Appeal was correct in setting
aside the Trial Division decision, dismissing the band's motion to
strike and allowing C.P.'s application for judicial review of the native
bands' ability to determine rights of appeal, was appealed by the
Matsqui Indian Band to the Supreme Court.
The final result in Matsqui, in a sense, both does and does not
turn on consideration of the issue of independence of an administrative
tribunal. The judgment provides a tortuous set of opinions, setting out
four distinct positions. L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier and
Iacobucci JJ., upheld the appeal on three grounds: that there was an
appropriate exercise of discretion below on the issue of tribunal
14

15

16

Reported at (1993] 1 F.C. 74, 58 F.T.R. 23 (T.D.).

Ibid. Joyal J. did not accept the first of the Band's two grounds of appeal - that
the decision could not be the subject of judicial review since the assessment bylaws expressly provided for a right of appeal to the Federal Court - Trial
Division. The issue of a statutory bar to judicial review under s. 18.5 of the
Federal Court Act was not argued in the Federal Court of Appeal (see [1993] 2
F.C. 641, (1994] l C.N.L.R. 66, 153 N.R. 307); nevertheless, Pratte J.A. found
there was no merit in the submission (at 646-647(F.C.)). The appeal went forward
to the Supreme Court on the second ground, whether there had been a proper
exercise of discretion below regarding the doctrine of adequate alternative
remedy (as developed in Hare/kin v. University of Regina, (1979] 2 S.C.R. 561,
(1979] 3 W.W.R. 676, 96 D.L.R. (3d) 14, 26 N.R. 364).
Reported at (1993] 2 F.C. 641, 58 F.T.R. 23 (C.A.) (Pratte, Decary and
Robertson JJ.A. concurring).
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adequacy and that there was no evidence of either institutional
partiality or institutional dependence (because both were too
premature). Lamer C.J. and Cory J., confirmed both that there was an
appropriate exercise of discretion below on the issue of tribunal
adequacy and that there was no evidence of inadequate institutional
impartiality (again holding that it was a premature question).
However, they dismissed the appeal on the issue of institutional
~ndependence (on the basis that the tribunal was not sufficiently
independent, and thus did not provide an adequate alternative
:emedy). McLachlin and Major JJ. dismissed the appeal solely on the
issue of lack of discretion below, since lack of jurisdiction in the Band
appeal process precluded the availability of an adequate alternative
remedy. They rendered no opinion on institutional impartiality or on
institutional independence. LaForest J. also dismissed the appeal, also
on the issue of lack of discretion below to dismiss the application for
judicial review, but for different reasons from those of McLachlin and
Major JJ. LaForest J. also rendered no opinion on the issues of
institutional impartiality or institutional independence.
It is apparent that a clear majority - six justices of nine consider the issues of institutional impartiality and institutional
independence relevant to the appeal. However, it is a minority of
three, who do not see those issues as relevant, who carry the day,
owing to a 4/2 split among those who do. The fact that Chief Justice
Lamer and Justice Cory not only consider the issues relevant, but
reason through, provide criteria, and then determine that the particular
tribunal is inadequate under those criteria is, in a sense, essentially
determinative of the final outcome of the appeal.
Unfortunately, playing out the numbers game is unsettling if
one is looking for guidance from our highest court on the issue of an
appropriate standard by which to judge tribunal independence. Six
justices (L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Cory JJ. and
Lamer C.J.) hold that it is at least something to consider. Four of those
six, while recognizing the validity of the concept of institutional
independence, are content to see whether it manifests itself in the
pr~cti~es of the tribunal. The remaining two propose taking an
objective look at the empowering legislation. Numerically, therefore,
twice as many justices think that a possible apprehension of lack of
institutional independence based solely on an examination of the
empowering legislation should not act as a barrier to tribunal decisionmaking, as think that it should. However, the former four languish in
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dissent in Matsqui, while Lamer and Cory JJ. find themselves a
pyrrhically-victorious rump among the majority in the result.
Questions naturally arise about the weight to be attributed to Lamer J.
versus Sopinka J.'s reasoning, and the impact either or both lines of
17
reasoning will have on future cases.
Before engaging in a detailed analysis of the reasoning
employed by the various groupings of justices, we will look at the
background of the regulatory scheme giving rise to the particular
dispute raised in Matsqui.

(b) The Matsqui Tribunal
(i) The Nature of Native Taxation Tribunals

After a lengthy negotiation process between federal and
provincial governments and representatives of Aboriginal peoples, the
Indian Ad 8 was amended in 1988 to allow Indian bands to establish
by-laws providing for the taxation of real property on reserve lands. In
19
1992, pursuant to the amended provisions of the Indian Act, seven
Indian bands in British Columbia developed taxation and assessment
by-laws. As required by s. 83( 1) of the Indian Act, these by-laws were
submitted for and received approval by the Minister prior to their
implementation. Each by-law set up a comprehensive taxation scheme
for property on the reserve, including assessment rolls, notices of
assessment, the appointment of courts of revision or boards of review
to hear appeals from assessment, followed by an appeal to the Federal
Court, Trial Division if necessary. The Matsqui band's by-law
interposed a second appeal to an assessment review committee prior to
recourse to the Federal Court. Despite this difference, and minor
variations as noted below between the first native appellate bodies, the
seven cases that culminated in Matsqui were heard concurrently at all
levels, as turning on essentially identical facts.
17
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Arguably the case might actually lack a ratio to isolate, in view of the effects of
splits of opinion which allowed a three-judge minority to carry the day on an
issue other than institutional independence. It could be seen as a portentous sign
that the Supreme Court, usually following the tightly rendered decision making
style of the United States Supreme Court, is moving towards an individualistic,
House of Lords, High Court of Australia style.

The Matsqui first level review tribunal, the court of revision,20
is composed of members appointed by the Chief and Band Council by
resolution (s. 27 A), who must take an oath to decide all complaints
impartially (s. 27D). Members are reimbursed for expenses incurred
and might be paid "reasonable remuneration" (s. 27C). The Siska
band, like the other five, has a single board of review level of appeal.
Its members, only one of whom can be a member of the Siska Indian
Band,21 are also appointed by the Chief and Band Council (s. 40. l ),
who can order the payment of remuneration to members (s. 40.3). All
members are reimbursed expenses incurred in carrying out their duties
(s. 40.3). All members must swear or affirm an oath of impartiality,
identical to the Matsqui oath (s. 40.4).
The Matsqui band's second level of appeal, the assessment
review committee,22 is established annually by the Chief and Band
Council by resolution (s. 35A), who also establishes the terms of
appointment, duties and remuneration of the members (s. 35B). The
three-member tribunal must be composed of (i) a person qualified to
practise law in the province or who is currently or formerly a judge of
the province (s. 35A. l ); (ii) a former member of the provincial
assessment appeal committee (s. 35A.2); and (iii) a member or agent
of the Matsqui band without conflict of interest in any appealed
assessment (s. 35A.3). One of the three members must be or have been
an accredited land appraiser (s. 35A.4). An appeal to this level of
review can arise from the person assessed, the assessor, the
commissioner below, or from the Band itself (s. 49A).
The Indian Taxation Advisory Board was also involved,
having published materials assisting the bands in designing and
establishing their taxation tribunals. 23 This material emphasized the
common law principles of a right to a hearing, by an impartial
24
tribunal, and specifically instructed that: " ... [W]hatever appeal
20

21

22
23

Indian Act, supra note 13.
19

24

Ibid., s. 83(1)-(6).
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Established by s. 27 of the Matsqui by-law. References to particular subsections
of the by-law are contained in parentheses within the text, where appropriate.
Section 40.2 ·of the Siska by-law. References in parentheses a.re to the appropriate
sections of this by-law.
Established bys. 35 of the Matsqui by-law.
This material included the 1990 manual, Introduction to Real Property Taxation
on Reserve [sic], to which Lamer CJ. refers in Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35. The
Indian Taxation Advisory Board also appeared as intervenors at the S.C.C.
Cite to Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35-36.
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mechanisms are put in place, they will have to adhere to the principles
of natural justice, since ... the appeal is in effect a subsequent
25
hearing." Lamer J. summarized what he considered to be the salient
generic features of these tribunals as follows:

Joyal J., in deciding to deny C.P. Ltd. recourse to judicial review on
the ground that there was an adequate alternative remedy, dismissed
the allegation as premature in a few lines near the end of his judgment:
It is true, as pointed out by applicant's counsel, that the first group of
by-laws to which I have referred provides in section 40(2) that
Boards of review shall consist of three members, only one of whom
may be a member of the Indian band. Counsel argues bias. At best,
this is a premature argument, no evidence being before me as to the
28
composition of any Board of review. [emphasis added]

.... [M]embers of the Siska Board of Review and the Matsqui Court of
Revision have no guarantee of salary. Under the Matsqui By-law,
members of the Court of Revision "may" receive remuneration,
while the Siska By-law also uses permissive language.
On the subject of security of tenure, the Matsqui tribunals are to be
appointed each year, although the terms of appointment are to be left
to the Chief and Band Council. One might presume that the members
of the tribunals are appointed for one-year terms; however, there is
nothing in the Matsqui By-law protecting members from arbitrary
dismissal mid-term. The Siska By-law is silent on all aspects of the
26
appointment of tribunal members.

Two further points should be noted. First, although in their
submissions to the Supreme Court alleging reasonable apprehension of
bias, C.P. drew a clear distinction between the source of bias for nonnative members and native members of the tribunals, 27 this distinction
was ignored by the Court. Second, the Court chose not to distinguish
Matsqui band's second level of appeal as substantially (or
procedurally) different from the other bands' single level of appeal.
(ii) Tracing the Treatment of the Bias Argument

Although C.P. presented arguments concerning reasonable
apprehension of bias at both levels of the Federal Court, in neither
instance did it receive serious consideration, nor was it considered
relevant to the determination. At the Federal Court, Trial Division,

Although reasonable apprehension of bias was apparently argued by
29
counsel for Canadian Pacific at the Federal Court of Appeal, Pratte
30
J.A. is silent on the issue in his reasons.
At the Supreme Court of Canada, however, reasonable
apprehension of bias, by way of a lack of sufficient institutional
independence, becomes determinative (except in the technical sense)
1
of the appeaJ.3 Lamer C.J. introduces the issue of bias in the fout1h of
four questions he poses regarding the exercise of discretion pursuant
to the adequate alternative remedy principle:
(iv) Is there a reasonable apprehension of bias in the appeal tribunals,
which would evidence the inadequacy of the statutory appeal
procedures.? JO-

Lamer C.J. determines that Joyal J. neither based his discretionary
decision regarding the adequacy of the alternative remedy on
irrelevant factors, nor acted unreasonably in light of the factors he did
consider. Then Lamer C.J. considers the question of bias at length, as
a relevant factor that Joyal J. failed to take into account. As noted, he
caiTies with him a clear majority of the Court 33 regarding the general
28
29

25

26

27

111

Matsqui, ibid. Dewar v. Ontario (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 334, 41 Admin. L.R. (2d)
202, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 273, 92 O.A.C. 264 (Div. Ct.) leave to appeal to S.C.C.
granted (October 29, 1996), Doc. CA Ml8920 (Ont. C.A.) provides an interesting
"solution" to Lamer C.J.'s concern about truncated terms of office.

30

Matsqui, supra note 5 at 42.

32

The source of bias for band members of tribunals was alleged to lay in their direct
and personal interest in the benefit of taxes spent on the reserve; the source of
bias for non-Indian members was alleged to be the uncertainty of remuneration
and insecurity of tenure or reappointment. Matsqui, supra note 5 at 31.

33

31

As quoted in Matsqui, supra note 5 at 47.
Mentioned by Lamer C.J. in Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35, in the course of
justifying his attention to the issue.
Matsqui, supra note 5.
It is interesting to observe that the issue of independence assumes such
importance at the eleventh hour. It would be fascinating to explore theories as to
why the four federal court judges missed its importance.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 25.
Cory J. concurs with Lamer C.J. throughout. Sopinka, Gonthier, Iacobucci and
L'Heureux-Dube JJ. agree with him on bias generally and on institutional
impartiality.
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question of bias and the first component question of institutional
impartiality. On the second specific component question, that of
institutional independence, only Lamer and Cory JJ. find the tribunal
insufficiently independent. This is sufficient, however, to cause the
appeal to fail. The result allowed Canadian Pacific to return to the
Federal Court, Trial Division for judicial review only on the
substantive question of whether their land was "in the reserve" and
34
thus taxable - where they succeeded. However, at least one
commentator has pointed out that a much more far-reaching
implication of the finding on independence is to render the entire
Indian taxation appeal regime as it stood at that time arguably
ineffective. 35

(c) The Issue of Independence at the Supreme Court
(i) The Reasoning of Lamer CJ.

Its effect on the result aside, there are at least four reasons
why Lamer C.J.'s extended reasoning on the independence of the
native administrative tribunals merits close examination. First, it,
along with Sopinka J.'s dissent, comprises the latest and most
extensive discussion of the issue of tribunal independence, to which
36
lower courts and legislators will attempt to look for guidance.
Second, the question of the status of administrative tribunal
independence is an ongoing subject of discussion; however,
government, in its structuring of administrative tribunals, seems to
See C.P. Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1996] 3 F.C. 373, (1997] 2 C.N.L.R. 16,
134 D.L.R. (4th) 555, 111 F.T.R. 161 (T.D.).
35

36
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have paid little heed to such theorizing, producing surprisingly
repetitious complaint and advice from decade to decade. 37 Third,
analytical tools for assessing agencies on the subject of independence
38
are still woefully underdeveloped. Fourth, despite a certain amount
of common ground, Lamer J.'s formalist approach - that sufficiency
of institutional independence may be assessed solely by examining the
legislation - stands in stark contrast to Sopinka J.'s holding that
institutional independence may only be assessed on the basis of the
agency in action.
A. The General Category: Bias
A reasonable apprehension of bias violates what has been
described as the second limb of the rules of natural justice. 39 It is
considered in two aspects - impartiality and independence - in
Matsqui. Lamer CJ. is careful to lay the groundwork on both limbs in
order to provide his opinion on institutional independence.
Lamer CJ. first acknowledges the important role Native
taxing power plays in encouraging self-government. He asserts that
those "underlying purpose and functions ... provide considerable
guidance in applying the principles of administrative law to the
statutory provisions at issue here.'"0 As a result of this, he employs a
purposive and functional approach where appropriate, although aware
that the matter is different from Beetz J.'s original approach." This
approach allows the Court's inquiry to be focused directly on the
intent of the legislator rather than on interpreting isolated provisions.42
After examining the history and application of the adequate
alternative remedy doctrine, Lamer CJ. proposes using an open-ended
37

P. Bryden, "Developments in the Supreme Court 1994-1995 Term" (1996) 7
Supreme Court L.R. 27 at 55. Query what course of action can now be taken by
parties dissatisfied with their assessment (or with the fact of being assessed, in
some cases).
2747-3174 Quebec Inc. v. Quebec (Regie des permis d' a/cool), [1996] 3 S.C.R.
919, 42 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 205 N.R. 1, is a more recent
decision on bias. However, the case (which sees Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. both
part of an 8-1 majority) turns on the issue of the intersection between impartiality
and independence, and in the discussion on independence, simply reviews the
same components - security of tenure, financial security and administrative
control - discussed here. The major disagreements between Lamer C.J. and
Sopinka J. seem to be little more than historical curiosities.
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See supra, Part 2.
In the cases relied upon by Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J., see sections A. - C. of this
part 3, below.
J.M. Evans et al., Administratfre Law: Cases, Texts and Materials, 4th ed.,
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1995) at 381.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 19.
U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, (1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, 35 Admin. L.R. 153, 89
C.L.L.C. 14,045, 95 N.R. 161, 24 0.A.C. 244 (per Beetz J.) in which the
approach was adopted in a jurisdictional analysis.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 19.
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set of factors to determine whether judicial review or a statutory
appeal procedure is apposite. The set of factors, including allegations
of bias, must remain open-ended to allow for the courts to isolate and
43
balance the relevant factors.
In the three issues that precede the question of bias, Lamer
C.J. maintains a consistently purposive approach. He approves of
Joyal J. 's attention to the important purpose of the empowering
legislation and recognition of Parliament's intention to allow bands to
develop their own appeal procedures. At the same time, Lamer C.J.
challenges the Federal Court of Appeal's ruling that setting a final
appeal to the Federal Court, Trial Division is ultra vires, given
Parliament's intention to give the bands considerable scope for
creating appeal procedures and subsequent Ministerial approval of the
regime. But it is the final issue - allegations of bias evidencing
inadequacy of the appeal tribunals - that Lamer C.J. posits as a
44
relevant factor not considered by Joyal J.
Lamer CJ. opens his analysis of the reasonable apprehension
45
of bias by looking at the Charter. He observes that s. l l(d) of the
Charter does not apply directly, as the case does not involve someone
46
charged with an offence, but then turns to R. v. Valente for assistance
regarding the correct approach to be taken for issues of bias, and
particularly the issues of independence and impartiality. In Valente,
LeDain J. stated that independence and impartiality are separate and
distinct values or requirements, defining them as
... [Impartiality is] a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in
relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case ... [whereas
independence] .. reflects or embodies the traditional constitutional
value of judicial independence. As such, [independence] connotes
not merely a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial
functions, but a status or relationship to others ... that rests on
objective conditions or guarantees. 47
43

45

46

47
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Lamer C.J. emphasizes that Valente stands for the proposition that
judicial independence involves both individual independence and
8
institutional independence.4 Lamer C.J. then relies on his own
49
reasoning in R. v. Genereux to elaborate. Regarding the approach to
determining tribunal impartiality
.. .the appropriate frame of reference is the "state of mind" of the
decision-maker. The circumstances of an individual case must be
examined to determine whether. ..the decision-maker. .. will be
subjectively biased in the particular situation.
Whereas independence is a matter of the status of the tribunal, which
... extends beyond the subjective attitude of the decision-maker.... The
status of a tribunal must guarantee not only its freedom from
interference by the executive and legislative branches of government
but also by any other external force, such as business or corporate
50
interests or other pressure groups.
Independence is further separated into two categories: the "appearance
of impartiality" regarding who may sit on the tribunal and the
"appearance of independence of these members" regarding their
security of tenure and remuneration. He points out that bias may not
be actual, but simply a reasonable apprehension thereof flowing from
51
the institutional structure.

B. Impartiality
Given that C.P. has not appealed to the tribunal, and band
members have not been appointed to a tribunal, Lamer CJ. next
agrees with Joyal J. that the allegation of bias on the basis of
impartiality is speculative. He nevertheless goes on to cite himself in

convincing for Lamer C.J. to tie these objective conditions back in to the
supposedly invidious effect they will have on the individual decision-maker,
producing a reasonable apprehension of bias akin to the "corporate taint"
argument.

Matsqui, ibid at 24.
Matsqui, ibid at 26, 30.

48

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.). [hereinafter Charter.]

49

[1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 49 C.R. (3d) 97, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 19 C.R.R. 354, 24
D.L.R. (4th) 161, 37 M.V.R. 9 (per LeDain J.) [hereinafter Valente].

50

Valente, supra note 46 at 685. Query whether it would have been more

115

51

Matsqui, supra note 5 at 32.

[1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, 70 C.C.C. (3d) I, 8 C.R.R. (2cl) 89, 88 D.L.R. (4th) l IO,
133 N.R. 241 [hereinafter Genereux].
Genereux.ibid. Both quotes are at 283-284.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 32.
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R. v. Lippe, where he asserted the logical necessity of recognizing the
existence of the concept of institutional or structural impartiality in
addition to the concept of individual impartiality. This is based on the
perception that independence has both an individual and institutional
aspect. 53 It developed into a threshold test in Lippe that asks will there
be a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a fully informed
54
person in a substantial number of cases?
The allegations in Matsqui fail to meet this threshold,
according to Lamer C.J., in two regards. First, community interest
representation on boards does not give rise to bias based on the finding
of Cory J. in the Newfoundland Telephone case. 55 Second, Lamer C.J.
approves Iacobucci J.'s functional approach in Pearlman, 56 which
assesses allegations of pecuniary bias within a wider legislative and
relevant experiential framework. The functional approach requires
examining not just the tribunal's empowering legislation, but the
wider context of the self-governing professions generally.
Accordingly, any general allegations of structural bias are necessarily
too remote and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 57 In this
way, Lamer's functional test becomes indistinguishable from a
contextual one.

52

53
54
55

56

57
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[1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 at 140, 61 C.C.C. (3d) 127 [hereinafter Lippe]. Lamer C.J.
is, as has been observed in some quarters, rather prone to "bootstrapping."
Evidence of this is delightfully presented in P. McCormick, "The Supreme Court
Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-up Citation on the Supreme Court of Canada
1989-1993" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 453.
Lippe, ibid, cited in Matsqui, supra note 5 at 32-33.
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C. Independence
The Valente principles establish areas of potential concern
with independence. Lack of payment, lack of security of tenure, and
appointment by band chiefs and councils were found determinative in
58
Valente. According to Lamer C.J., Joyal J. committed a reversible
error by not considering whether these conditions compromised the
tribunals' structural integrity. 59
However, before outlining his analysis on this sub-issue,
Lamer C.J. repudiates the use of context in dealing with structural
independence. To him, it may dilute the requirements of natural
justice:
... [W]hile I agree that the larger context of Aboriginal selfgovernment informs the determination of whether the statutory
appeal procedures ... constitute an adequate alternative remedy .. ./
cannot agree ... that this context is relevant to the question of tvhether
the bands' tribunals give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias
at an institutional level. In my view, principles of natural justice
apply to the band's tribunals as they would apply to any tribunal
60
perfo1ming similar functions. [emphasis added]

Note how Lamer C.J. switches back to the term "bias" rather than
using "independence" or "impartiality." Further, he dismisses context
immediately after performing a context-based analysis on the issue of
apprehension of insufficient structural impartiality (preferring to call it
"functional")6'. He invokes the principles of natural justice as his
reason for rejecting policy considerations, as such consideration would
"dilute natural justice" in some unspecified way. 62
Once again Lamer C.J. uses Valente as his analytical starting
point. Relying on Gonthier J. 's statement about judicial independence
in /. W.A. v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd.,63 Lamer C.J.
applies the Valente principles of judicial independence. He does

Lippe, ibid at 144 (emphasis in the original).
Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of
Public Utilities), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 623 at 635, 4 Admin. LR. (2d) 121, 89 D.L.R.
(4th) 289, 134 N.R. 241, 95 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 271 (Cory J.) [hereinafter
Newfoundland Telephone]. Similarly, the presence of "interest" in tripartite
labour tribunals is considered acceptable.
Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, (1991] 2 S.C.R. 869, 2
Admin. L.R. 185, (1991] 6 W.W.R. 289, 6 C.R.R. (2d) 259, 84 D.L.R. (4th) !05
[hereinafter Pearlman].
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 34.

58
59

60
61

62
63

See Valente, supra note 46 at headings III-V.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35.

Matsqui, ibid at 35.
See discussion at notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 35.

[1990] 1 S.C.R. 282 at 332, 42 Admin. L.R. 1, 90 C.L.L.C. 14,007, 69 D.L.R.
(4th) 524, 105 N.R. 161. [hereinafter Consolidated Bathurst]
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acknowledge, however, that a strict application of them is not always
64
warranted in an administrative context. But that even absent
constitutional protection, judicial independence, as part of the rules of
natural justice, pertains to administrative tribunals because a party
deserves a hearing that is not only independent in fact, but also
appears independent. 65 Retreating once again to the term "bias," Lamer
66
C.J. sets out the classic test for reasonable apprehension of bias, and
confirms that flexibility of approach is crucial in applying the test for
bias in the context of administrative tribunals. In support, he quotes
his argument from Committee for Justice & Liberty recommending an
analysis that, in effect, amounts to a functional or contextual
approach:
... [T]he requirements of natural justice must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under
which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt
67
with, and so forth.

From this Lamer CJ. concludes that the test should be applied in light
68
of the functions being performed by the particular tribunal. The
approach should also be flexible, determined by a ranking of the
interests at stake. For example, security of the person matters dictate a
strict application of Valente criteria, whereas property matters such as
6-l

65

66

67

68
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Matsqui, supra note 5 at 37. Lamer C.J. bases this on decisions of the Federal
Court of Appeal in MacBain v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),
f 1985) l F.C. 856, 16 Admin. L.R. 109, 22 D.L.R. (4th) 119, 62 N.R. 117 (C.A.)
[hereinafter MacBain], Sethi v. Canada (Minister of Employment &
Immigration), [19881 2 F.C. 552, 31 Admin. L.R. 123, 52 D.L.R. (4th) 681, 87
N.R. 389 (C.A.) [hereinafter Sethi] and Mohammad v. Canada (Minister of
Employment & Immigration) (1988), [1989] 2 F.C. 363, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 91
N.R. 121 (C.A.) [hereinafter Mohammad].
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 37. This reasoning is based on a consideration of
Valente in Consolidated Bathurst, supra note 63 at 332 (per Gonthier J.).

As set out by de Grandpre J. in Committee for Justice & liberty v. Canada
(National Energy Board), [1978) 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 716, 9 N ..R.
115 [hereinafter Committee for Justice & Liberty].

tax assessment dictate something more flexible. The problem with this
approach is that it sounds and feels very much - in fact exactly like the contextual approach Lamer CJ. has just denounced as
inappropriate.
Having established a set of ground rules, Lamer C.J. then
derives the appropriate test to be applied in the current case:
... The Valente principles must be considered in light of the nature of
the appeal tribunals themselves, the interests at stake, and other
indices of independence, in order to dete1mine whether a reasonable
and right minded person, viewing the whole procedure as set out in
the assessment by-laws, would have a reasonable apprehension of
bias on the basis that the members of the appeal tribunals are not
independent. 69 [emphasis added]

Lamer CJ. then compares the structure of the regulatory scheme with
the factors delimiting institutional independence. He demonstrates that
members of the appeal tribunals perform adjudicative functions not
unlike those of courts. He observes that the language regarding
remuneration is permissive, as members may receive remuneration but
are not guaranteed a salary. Further, that payment might only be
provided after a decision in a case. On the subject of security of
tenure, Lamer C.J. interprets the by-laws as indicating that although
appointments are to be made annually, the length of term is only
presumptively one year. Matsqui members could be arbitrarily
dismissed mid-term, and the Siska band could, if it wished, appoint
tribunal members on an ad hoc basis or could refuse to re-appoint
members who reached decisions contrary to the interests of the band.
He expresses serious reservations on this issue, as the possibility that
tribunal members may be removed from their position at any time is
. 11 y open to abuse.70
potentia
Lamer CJ. poses his concern about the third Valente principle
- administrative control - in terms of the selection procedure. Since
the bands also select the members of the tribunals (in addition to
controlling remuneration and tenure), there appears to be a
dependency relationship between the tribunals and the bands. Added
to this is the fact that a native band may be a party before a tribunal.
He concludes that parties appearing at the tribunal may therefore

Ibid. at 395, quoting Tucker LJ. in Russell v. Duke of Nmfolk, [1949) 1 All E.R.
109 at 118.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 39. Query how Lamer C.J. could conceivably reconcile
this with his position as stated at 35 in Matsqui, quoted earlier in this section
(notes 60-61 and accompanying text). He makes no attempt to do so.
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Matsqui, ibid.
Matsqui, ibid at 42.
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present their case before a tribunal whose memb~rs ar~ afipointed by
the very band chiefs and councils who opp~se thelf cl_ai~1: To ~amer
C.J., this raises a concern similar to the one m MacBazn, m which the
prosecutor of human rights abuses also selected the members of the
adjudicating panel.
.
The Matsqui band counter with two arguments, both of which
are dismissed by Lamer C.J. First is the notion that an oath of
impartiality will counterbalance any tendency t~ be biased. L~mer C.J.
finds that though this may be a factor to take mto account, 1t cannot
73
act as a substitute for financial security and security of tenure. The
second argument relates to the comparative seriousness of the interest
at stake - tax assessment - as compared to security of the person
which was at issue in Sethi. 74 Again, while Lamer C.J. notes that it is a
consideration to take note of when applying the Valente principles, it
is not convincing enough to enable him to discard these principles. He
reiterates the point that the Valente principles, while flexible, cannot
be ignored or discarded.
.
.
. .
Based on the foregoing, the Chief Justice fmds msuffic1ent
independence. Emphasizing that it is the combined w~ight ?f the t~ree
factors which produces his conclusion, Lamer C.J. fmds msuffic1ent
institutional independence based on:
( 1) complete absence of financial

security for tribunal

members,
(2) complete absence (in the Siska Band) or ambiguit~ and
thus inadequacy (in the Matsqui Band) of secunty of
tenure, and
(3) by virtue of the appointment process, detem1ination by
75
tribunal members of the interests of their appointers.
He subsequently repeats that any one factor, taken in isolation, would
not necessarily lead to the same conclusion, offering as a counterexample the majority of provincial tax assessment regimes. Though
71

Matsqui, ibid at 43.

72

Supra note 64.

73

74
75
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many of these fail to guarantee security of tenure or remuneration,
they appear to address the administrative control factor by ensuring
that appointments are made by a different level of government from
those whose interests, in proceedings before them, are directly at
stake. 76
In closing, Lamer C.J. attempts to clarify two issues. First, he
recognizes that encouraging aboriginal self-government might
preclude ceding appointment powers to the federal government.
Bearing this in mind, he sets out examples of minimum requirements
that would satisfy the need for sufficient institutional independence:
the bands' by-laws must guarantee remuneration, stipulate periods of
tenure, and restrict dismissal during tenure to dismissal for cause. The
second point is that for the purposes of analyzing prematurity, Lamer
C.J. differentiates between the concepts of institutional impartiality
and institutional independence. While agreeing that allegations
regarding impartiality are premature, since it is not possible to know
in advance of a hearing what members think, Lamer C.J. asserts that
this is not the case regarding independence. Independence and
impartiality are distinct, and any inquiry on independence need solely
examine the actual objective structure of the tribunal. In the latter
case, according to Lamer C.J., it is sufficient to simply examine the
by-laws and apply the Valente principles in order to reach a
conclusion. The by-laws, in this analysis, become "conclusive
evidence" of insufficient independence.77
Finally, Lamer C.J. states his fundamental disagreement with
Sopinka J. 's argument that institutional independence needs to be
assessed in the context of an actual tribunal hearing. He characterizes
Sopinka J.'s view as one interpreting the silence of the bylaws on
tenure and remuneration as a discretion in the bands to implement
their by-laws in a manner consistent with natural justice. This offends
Lamer C.J.'s view of institutional independence, which functions to
ensure that a tribunal is legally structured so that its members are
reasonably independent of those who appoint them. Moreover,
institutional independence ensures that tribunal independence is not
left to the discretion of those who appoint the tribunals. If institutional
independence exists, according to Lamer C.J., it must be located in the

Matsqui, supra note 5 at 43.

76

Supra note 64.

77

Matsqui, supra note 5 at 43-44.
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Matsqui, ibid at 44.
Matsqui, ibid at 45.
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empowering bylaws; achieving it by a hopeful exercise of discretion is
1·11 usory. 78

123

toward maintammg aboriginal rights, Sopinka J. insists that any
assessment of institutional independence based solely on the bare
wording of the by-laws themselves, without full regard given to their
context, and thus their practical application, is incomplete.82

(ii) The Reasoning of Sopinka J.

Sopinka J. and Lamer C.J. are m agreement regarding all
issues concerning bias with the exception of institutional
independence. Sopinka J. also follows the same four-step process
employed by Lamer C.J. But it is the final two where their analyses
diverge: the relevance of the context of Aboriginal self-government as
it relates to institutional independence, and the need for courts to
consider the practice of the tribunal as depicted in the context of an
actual hearing.
A. The Importance of Context in a Case Dealing with Natives
Underlying all of Sopinka J.'s analysis is a heavy reliance on
the need to evaluate independence in context. He begins by noting that
Lamer C.J. recognizes the importance of context in applying Valente:
the essential conditions of institutional independence .. .in the judicial
context need not be applied with the same strictness in the case of
administrative tribunals. Conditions of institutional independence
must take into account their context. 19 [emphasis in the original]

The primary contextual factor in this case, considered and relied upon
by Joyal J. at first instance, is the importance of nurturing native selfgovernment initiatives, here seen through the taxation regimes. 80 Given
the broad, general interpretive principles developed in previous
Supreme Comt cases dealing with native tax exemptions, 81 weighted
78

79
80

81

B. The Importance of Tribunal Practice as Relevant Context
While fully agreeing with Lamer C.J. that a tribunal must
comply with the principles of natural justice, the essential question for
Sopinka J. is what relevant information must the reasonable and rightminded person be expected to know, or discover, in order to
sufficiently determine whether there is a reasonable apprehension of
bias in a tribunal. Where Lamer C.J. would limit the information to the
procedure set out in the by-laws, Sopinka J. would expand this
information to knowledge of how the tribunal operates in actual
practice. Assessing compliance with the principles of natural justice
cannot be made, according to Sopinka J., absent a clear understanding
of the relevant and operational context. 83 Sopinka J. supports this
contention by drawing on Committee for Justice & Liherty. 84 There, de
Grandpre J. held that the relevant context for analysis of natural
justice could include "the circumstances of the case, the nature of the
inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter
85
that is being dealt with, and so forth." For Sopinka J., this approach
should be employed in determining both institutional independence
and institutional impartiality.
Sopinka J. supports his thesis first with a number of cases
concerning institutional impartiality in which context was
considered,86 asserting that their relevance rests on a minimal
theoretical distinction between the impartiality and independence in
Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 143, [1990] 5 W.W.R. 97, [1990] 3
C.N.L.R. 46, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 67 Man. R. (2d) 81.

Matsqui, ibid at 46.
Matsqui, ibid, at 48-49.

82

No direct connection is made (nor, presumably, intended) between the objective
of empowering native self-government and the specific structure given the
tribunals in the by-laws. Although arguably the structure arose more out of the
presumed part-time, occasional nature of their task, N. Des Rosiers, in her
presentation to the Federal Court members (see note 138, infra) implies a more
direct connection.

83

Sopinka J. makes reference to the cases of Nowegijick v. R., [ 1983] l S.C.R. 29 at
36, (1983] 2 C.N.L.R. 89, (1983] C.T.C. 20, 144 D.L.R. (3d) 193, and Mitchell v.

See Matsqui, supra note 5 at 50.
See Matsqui, ibid at 51.
Supra note 66.

85
86

Matsqui, supra note 5 at 51, citing Committee for Justice & Liberty, ibid. at 395.
Lippe, supra note 52 (context of steps taken by part-time judges to render
themselves impartial overcomes perception of bias); Pearlman, supra note 56
(wider context of Aci and experience overcomes perception of bias).
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the administrative context. 87 He follows by citing a number of cases
where a tribunal's actual practice was used to assess institutional
88
independence. On the basis of this case law, he draws the conclusion
that the institutional bias question has, in general, been considered
after the tribunal has been appointed and/or actually rendered
judgment, and that considering contextual facts does not fall outside
an "objective" consideration of institutional independence. 89
At the core of Sopinka J.'s reasoning is how to treat by-laws
which are silent with regard to factors relevant to the Valente
principles. When such factors are only vaguely or partly set out (or not
at all), Sopinka J. concludes that it is not safe to form conclusions
about the institution on the wording of the by-laws alone. He feels that
the objective consideration requires, in the face of "missing" elements,
a context "enriched" by "knowledge of the operational reality.'"'0 As
no panel had been appointed in this instance, it is Sopinka J.'s
contention that the missing elements may have been satisfactorily
addressed upon appointment. On this basis he holds that Joyal J.
properly exercised his discretion at first instance and properly
considered that the issue of bias was premature. 91

4. EXPLORING THE VALUE OF MATSQUI
The essential controversy between Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J.
in Matsqui on the question of institutional independence can be
reduced to two central, related, issues:

87

Matsqui, supra note 5 at 52.

88

Alex Couture Inc. v. Canada (Procureur general) (1991), 83 D.L.R. (4th) 577 38
C.P.R. (3d) 293, 41 Q.A.C. 1, [1991] R.J.Q. 2534 (C.A.) leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused (1992), 91 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note), 42 C.P.R. (3d) v (note) (actual
appointment terms and general government policy on remuneration of tribunal
members considered in addition to the statutory scheme on its face); MacBain,
supra note 64 (the scheme of both the legislation and how the legislation
operated in practice considered); Mohammad, supra note 64 (range of operational
factors considered in determining independence of immigration adjudicators).
89
90

91

Matsqui, supra note 5 at 52-53.
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1. In examining an administrative tribunal for reasonable
apprehension of bias based on lack of sufficient
institutional independence, what are the necessary and
sufficient conditions of knowledge required of the
hypothetical "reasonable and right-minded person"? Does
an "objective" assessment consist solely of an
examination of the relevant legislation, or should/must it
also include consideration of the "operational context"?
2.

What is the appropriate treatment of empowering
legislation which is silent, vague, or incomplete with
regard to the three principles set out in Valente?

On both of these issues, the two justices seriously disagree. Lamer CJ.
holds that the reasonable and right-minded person need only look to
the wording of the empowering legislation in order to be sufficiently
informed, and that silent, vague or incomplete empowering legislation
must be cured by the imposition of sufficient guarantees to satisfy a
minimum standard of independence. Sopinka J. holds that the
reasonable and right-minded person must look beyond the bare
wording of the legislation to the operational context or risk making an
uninformed decision, and that the operational, contextual approach is
even more necessary in the face of silent, vague or incomplete
empowering legislation.
While stressing the flexible application of Valente principles
in an administrative context, and employing a purposive approach for
much of the judgment, Lamer CJ. delivers in the end a purely
formalist, determinist answer on the issue of institutional
independence. Sopinka J., on the other hand, agrees in principle with
much of Lamer C.J.'s reasoning, but instead of holding back and
making artificial distinctions between impartiality and independence,
insists on imposing the contextual approach to the issue of
institutional independence as well.
Two things stand out about the judgment of Lamer CJ. The
first is that institutional independence assumes, by the end of his
reasons, the weight of a fully-fledged common-law doctrine setting
out the minimum conditions required to prevent a reasonable
apprehension of bias on the basis of a lack of independence.92
Unfortunately, it is by no means clear that such a common law

Matsqui, ibid at 53.
92

See Matsqui, ibid at 53.
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Matsqui, ibid at 44-45.
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95

doctrine need necessarily arise from the principles enunciated in
Valente, or if it does, that it need necessarily take the explicit fo1m
given it by Lamer C.J. It is impossible to determine why viewing ~y
93
law procedures, which in a~d of themselves beco~e. con.clu.s1~e
94
evidence of independence, 1s adequate for estabhshmg Judicial
standards of review. The second point to note is that Lamer CJ.
reduces the analysis necessary for finding reasonable apprehension of
bias to a mechanistic exercise. To him, applying the Valente principles
to the wording of legislation allows one to come to a conclusion on the
issue. However, one must ask, what exactly are the flexible principles
(as both Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J. grant that Valente provides, even
in the administrative arena) if one applies the Valente principles
mechanistically to the wording of the legislation? In other words, can
a flexible set of criteria ever be applied to specific wording without
generating many, differentiated, conclusions?
As Sopinka J. observes, the problem is that the legislation may
be silent, vague, or incomplete in its attention to the Valente criteria.
In the face of silence, Lamer C.J. demands explicit remediation by
adding specific reference to security of tenure and remuneration and
administrative control; in the face of that same silence, Sopinka J.
looks for operational, contextual details of the tribunal in action in
order to examine its independence.
The next section looks at the reasoning in more detail,
showing where the justices agree, disagree and where they failed to
consider the issues at all. We then explore the new "doctrine" of
institutional independence developed in Matsqui, and speculate as to
how this decision may play out in the future.

independence. Although it must be remarked that all the reasoning
regarding independence is technically obiter, areas in which Lamer
CJ. and Sopinka J. agree can be considered quite significant, in that
they carry the weight of six of the nine judges of the Court.
Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. agree that s. l l (d) of the Charter,
while not applying directly to administrative tribunals, is relevant to
some degree in examining bias. This is based on the Valente case,
which acts as a guide in applying s. I I (d) to cases of bias, impartiality
and independence in a tribunal. Moreover, the essential conditions of
independence, as laid out in Valente in the judicial context, must be
applied flexibly and in a manner sensitive to the context in the case of
96
administrative tribunals. Both justices also implicitly agree that
individual and institutional impartiality and independence are all
separable components of a test for apprehension of bias, and may be
analyzed separately.
Both justices allude to the need to examine each case on its
own merits, and at the appropriate time. They implicitly recognize that
the requisite level of independence will vary with the importance of
the rights of the parties that are at stake and that allegations of
apprehension of bias based on lack of impartiality are speculative
prior to establishing a tribuna1. 97 The test to be applied in cases of
impartiality is that for bias
the "reasonable, right-minded person"
test - and the test for institutional impartiality - will there be a
developed by Lamer
perception in a substantial number of cases?
C.J. in Lippe. This functional approach acknowledges that context
plays a relevant and necessary factor in the analysis. 98
Most interesting of all, both justices consider institutional
independence a part of natural justice. In Lamer CJ. 'swords:
My colleague Sopinka J. does not dispute that institutional
independence is a principle of natural justice which applies to the
99
band tribunals

(a) The Reasoning on Independence
(i) Common Ground

Much of the common ground in the respective analyses of
Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J. is implicit, in that Sopinka J. opens his
analysis with the statement that he is in agreement with the Chief
Justice on all issues with the exception of his position on institutional

95

96
97

98

93

See Matsqui, ibid at 43.
99

See Matsqui, ibid at 45.

Matsqui, ibid at 47.
Matsqui, ibid, Lamer C.J. at 31, Sopinka J. at 48.
Matsqui, ibid, Lamer C.J. at 32, Sopinka J. at 53.
Matsqui, ibid, note 5, Lamer C.J. at 33-34, Sopinka J. at 5 l. Based on Iacobucci
J.'s approach developed in Pearlman, supra note 56.
Matsqui, supra, note 5, at 45.
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and, although somewhat more ambiguous, Sopinka J. states:
I do not disagree with the Chief Justice that the band taxation
tribunals must comply with the principles of natural justice. 100

Support by a clear majority of the court for the following propositions
heralds a doctrinal great leap forward: agreement that independence
and impartiality are recognizable as clearly-delineated, separable
components of the general test for bias; the clear recognition of
autonomous institutional analogues capable of independent testing;
and the arguably implicit recognition of institutional independence as
a common law principle of natural justice. However, it is the
fundamental disagreement between Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J. on what
they see - or should see - once they arrive at that common ground,
that becomes the focus of the analysis.

(ii) World's Apart
Whereas much of the agreement in the two sets of reasons is
implicit, in the end the disagreements between Lamer CJ. and
Sopinka J. are loud, firm, and explicit. Having travelled much of the
way together and having forged a new path toward an analysis of
structural independence, on arrival the two justices disagree not just
on what it is they see, but on how to look at it.
Lamer CJ. 's position is based on a number of tenets, most of
which are the result of a formalistic examination of the by-law and a
retreat from his position on context. In his view, a purposive
examination of context is not relevant to the question of reasonable
apprehension of bias at an institutional level, 101 since consideration of
context in an institutional setting will "dilute natural justice." 102
Instead, the appropriate test is whether a reasonable and right-minded
person, viewing the whole procedure as set out in the assessment bylaws, would have a reasonable apprehension of bias on the basis that
the members are not independent. 103

Examining the by-law in this instance leads Lamer C.J. to spot
evidence of bias. For one, the appointing bodies may appear later as
parties to an appeal, and are thus opposed in interest to other parties
who appear before the tribunaI.1 04 Secondly, giving weight to an oath
of impartiality in the absence of explicit guarantees of remuneration
and security of tenure, and attempting to weigh the relative property
interests versus security of the person interests, ignores the Valente
principles. 105 Lamer CJ.'s solution to this is that the third Valente
principle, administrative control, is normally addressed by
appointment powers being placed in a different level of government. If
the purpose of the legislation makes this undesirable, legislation must
include explicit guarantees of remuneration, periods of tenure, and
removal of members only for cause.
In answer to the concerns about the inquiry being premature,
Lamer CJ. holds that an objective inquiry focused on the actual
structure of a tribunal can be made prior to the formation of the
tribunal. Again, he returns to the empowering by-laws. By applying
the Valente principles, one can determine conclusively, in isolation,
without benefit of a hearing, whether bias exists. Even silence in
empowering legislation constitutes a discretion in the appointing body
to ensure (or not ensure) sufficient institutional independence, which
discretion is itself violative of the "institutional independence
doctrine. " 106
As mentioned previously, Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. do not
disagree on the fundamental issues. Sopinka J. restricts his overt
disagreement with Lamer C.J. to a handful of points. His first concern
is the use of context. Sopinka J. states that context must be looked at
in cases of institutional independence because it is relevant and
necessary. This is especially true when one is basing a decision on the
principles of natural justice, which cannot be applied in the absence of
a clear understanding of the relevant, operational context of a tribunal,
and as borne out by previous case law. 107

104
JOO

IOI

102
103

Matsqui, ibid at 51.
Matsqui, ibid at 35.

Ills
106

Matsqui, ibid at 32.
7

Matsqui, ibid at 39.
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Matsqui, ibid at 43. This is an implicit disagreement with Sopinka J., who makes
the point that it is premature - see Matsqui at 53.
Matsqui, ibid at 43.
Matsqui, ibid at 45.
Matsqui, ibid at 50-52.

130

CDN. JOURNAL OF ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE

Sopinka J. then addresses both the matter of prematurity and
the idea of reviewing by-laws raised by Lamer C.J. He argues that any
decision regarding institutional bias based on insufficient institutional
independence is premature if it occurs before a tribunal has been
formed, as there has been no chance to observe the tribunal operating
in practice. Presumably, Sopinka J. is placing weight on the need to
see the actual terms of appointment and how they may spell out
provisions relating to the duration of appointment, dismissability and
remuneration. For him the proper place for considering the
institutional bias question in general is after the tribunal has been
appointed and/or rendered judgment, particularly when the
empowering legislation is silent, vague or incomplete in terms of the
Valente principles. ios More generally, he notes difficulties inherent
with Lamer C.J.'s formalistic approach, showing how focussing on
legislative wording is inadequate. The approach also violates the
necessity for flexibility in applying the Valente principles to the
administrative context, at least when the legislation is silent on the
.
"
d"iscret10n.
. 109
Issue,
or con1ers
It is important to note two things about the justices'
disagreement. First, prior to venturing out on the independence
"limb," they are both in essential agreement on all aspects of the test
for apprehension of bias. This includes the first limb, impartiality, and
the need for flexibility and attention to context when applying the
Valente principles. Second, on institutional independence, Lamer
C.J. 's position becomes strictly formalist, whereas Sopinka J.'s
position remains contextualist.

(iii)Areas of Silence
While it is important that judges, in general, should confine
themselves as much as possible to the issues before the court, it is
arguably equally important that if an issue is judged relevant and is
dealt with - whether dispositive or not - it is incumbent on the
judges of our highest court to be mindful that their reasoning carries

108

109

•
the
Matsqui, ibid at 53. Although the argument has merit after appointment,
suggestion that one should wait until after a case has been decided to determine
bias is highly dubious.

Matsqui, ibid at 50.
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weight in future cases. In areas of unsettled or unclear law, Supreme
Court obiter can be useful in providing guidance, or it can obfuscate
and sow further confusion. Therefore, if a decision is offered, the
reasoning should be carried out in a sufficiently comprehensive
manner and with attention to the core areas needing treatment.
In this regard, it is possible that Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J.
failed to pay adequate attention to the ramifications of the way in
which they play out their disagreement. Two significant factors are
,
either ignored or insufficiently treated.
The first factor is the widely-recognized complex typology of
administrative agencies, 110 on which both justices are silent. In
Matsqui, the tribunals were established by subordinate legislatio~
equivalent to regulation. The question is left untreated whe.ther, and, If
so how the reasoning on institutional independence will apply to
tribunal; established directly by statute, given the fact of legislative
supremacy and the presumption of constitutionality. No attempt is
made in the judgment to anchor "independence" firmly in a general
legal framework - either statutory or constitutional.
The second factor is the role played by the Constitution and/or
the Charter, which is insufficiently treated in the reasoning in
Matsqui. Although s. 1 I (d) of the Charter is used to build t~e stand~rd
basis for the Valente principles, and Lamer C.J. makes bnef mention
of "security of the person" in contrast with "lesser interests" (without
111
the w.ay in ~hic.h .such
making explicit reference to s.7),
considerations should inform the analysis of mstitut1onal
independence is left open. Further, adopting an inflexibl~, formalist
approach, where purely economic interests of a corporat10n were at
stake, leaves open the question of what further imposition of Charter
standards would be possible in a case in which clearer personal
interests were at issue. In terms of the Constitution itself, as above, no
mention is made of any possible relevance of the subordinate nature of
the pertinent legislation.
The net result of such lacunae in analysis is either to leave the
decision-makers below to "tack on" their own reasoning with regard to
those issues or to mistake the reasoning here as complete, when it is
not. In some instances this may not be important. In other cases, it
110

Recognized throughout the many studies and reports mentioned in Part 2 of this
paper.

111

See Matsqui, supra note 5 at 31.
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may be crucial. Either way, it is now unclear, after Lamer C.J.'s
decision, what role context plays in. institutional bias cases. It is this
failure of the Court to carefully explore the implications of its reasons
to which we now turn.

(b) The New "Doctrine" of Institutional Independence
Any critique of the "doctrine" of institutional independence
an~mg fr~m Matsqui must focus on Lamer C.J. 's reasoning. It is the
Ch1e_f Justice who has supplied the major pai1 of the prior reasoning in
previous cases on this subject, as he implicitly recognizes by citing
?imself in Lippe and Genereux. Sopinka J.'s reasoning on the issue is,
m essence, purely reactive to, and arises from his disagreement with,
Lamer C.J.'s analysis. But Lamer C.J.'s approach to the treatment of
empowering legislation that is silent, vague or incomplete with regard
to the Valente criteria of tenure, remuneration and administrative
control is inadequate. There are at least six weaknesses in Lamer
C.J.'s reasoning that undermine this new test for reasonable
apprehension of bias. Sopinka J. 's reply also falls short in a number of
areas.

C.P. had not applied to the appeal tribunals, and the band members
113
were not appointed. But his approach is different when the issue of
institutional impartiality arises. The combined silence, vagueness and
incompleteness of the by-laws on a number of factors pertinent to the
Valente principles of judicial independence become conclusive
114
evidence of the tribunals' insufficient independence. Lamer C.J.
substantiates his conclusion by cataloguing those things which might
happen. These include the possibility that

. .

(i) Lamer C.J.' s Six Pitfalls

First off, Lamer C.J. argues that while context is important for
deciding ~ndividual impartiality, it is irrelevant when considering
structural mdependence. This is at once contradictory, because he also
acknowledges how the nature of the tribunal itself is important. 112 In
any event, when he does go on to ignore context by restricting the
rele~ant i~formation to the bare wording of the by-law, he not only
acts mflex1bly, but arbitrarily. Flexibility based upon considerations of
whether a tribunal is adjudicative, policy-making, or mixed must
surely go beyond the bare wording of the by-law. His attempt to
sufficiently differentiate "bias" from "institutional independence" in
order to abandon notions of context and function is hindered by
repeated conflation of the two terms.
Second, Lamer C.J. has an easy time dismissing allegations
regarding the impartiality of band members as speculative because

113
114

116

See arguments at Part 3, sections (c)(i) B. and C.

•

members might not be paid

•

members might be dismissed mid-term or at any time

•

members might be paid only after a decision

•

members might be appointed ad hoc for no particular term

•

members making a wrong decision might not be
reappointed. 115

But as Sopinka J. is at pains to point out, the opposite could also be
true. Sometimes waiting and seeing may be perfectly fair and
unbiased. 116 As with the arbitrary restriction of the question of bias to
the wording of the by-law, the sudden switch from the use of
speculation as a reason not to draw a conclusion on impartiality, to
using it to draw a negative conclusion on independence, is
disconcerting.
Third, that the by-laws indicate both self-selection of
members, and control of remuneration and tenure produces, in Lamer
C.J.'s view, an appearance of dependency between the tribunal and the
band. Here is a clear manifestation of the contextual approach that
Lamer C.J. insisted would not be applicable in his institutional
independence analysis. The possibility for cases appearing before the
tribunal in which a particular band does not appear is given no weight
in the analysis. Were the by-laws to set out that the bands were to be a
party to every appeal, Lamer C.J. would have more to work with. And
his prescriptiv~ cure - guarantees of remuneration and tenure with

115

112

133

Matsqui, supra note 5 at 32.
Matsqui, ibid, at 45.
Matsqui, ibid at 42 (emphasis added).
Matsqui, ibid at 53.
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dismissal only for cause, with no mention of the third Valente
principle 117 - downplays the problem he previously identifies, and
remains arbitrary.
Fourth, the simplicity of the test offered by Lamer C.J. application of the Valente principles to the tax appeal tribunal's bylaws
is deceptive. The principles in Valente were developed in the
context of a criminal case, directly involving interpretation of the
content of the protections afforded the judiciary under ss. 96-101 of
the Constitution, in conjunction with the protections afforded an
accused under s. 11 (d) of the Charter. Lamer C.J. merely asserts that
Valente provides guidance in assessing tribunal independence. Then
he notes that the Federal Court of Appeal applied the Valente
118
principles to administrative tribunals in a number of cases. However,
119
he fails to indicate (although Sopinka J. in response does ) that all
these cases were brought after a tribunal rendered a decision, that they
may not be authority for using Valente's s. l l(d) concerns in an
20
administrative context1 and of these cases, two relied on context
anyway. Taken together, it is questionable whether the cases should be
used as bare authority for the application of these principles to the
administrative context. But Lamer C.J. continues by asserting that it is
a principle of natural justice that a party before an adjudicative
tribunal should receive a hearing which is not only independent, but
also appears independent. 121 He again reiterates the idea of flexibility
122
recommended by de Grandpre J. in Committee for Justice & Liberty,
but he demonstrates this by limiting the test to a review of the
123
assessment by-laws. The dictates of natural justice, according to
Lamer C.J.'s reading of them, provide little room for flexibility after
all, at least in the area of institutional independence.
117
118
119

i:?o

121

122
123
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Fifth, Lamer C.J. generates from his analysis a number of
formalist conclusions. All seem the product of, at best, inadequate
foundational reasoning. Oaths of impartiality in office are dismissed
as an insufficient substitute for financial security or security of tenure
in assessing the institutional independence of a tribunal. This is based
on Lamer C.J.'s conflation of the indicia of individual impartiality
with that of institutional independence, two concepts he had earlier
carefully segregated. Ignoring the different weight that should be
ascribed to property interests relative to security of the person interests
points out the problem of refusing to frame an analysis in terms of the
Bill of Rights 124 or the Charter. 125 And, due to his equivocation on the
three factors of financial security, security of tenure and interested
party adjudication, a tribunal's by-laws could reflect any one of five
permutations to escape from a finding of insufficient institutional
independence. 126 In effect, Lamer C.J. specifies a doctrine that can be
satisfied, minimally, in one of two ways. Either a statute should
specify security of remuneration and tenure, or it should specify
appointment by another level of government. If this is indeed what he
meant it is unfortunate it was not stated more clearly. Further, to
coher~ with his own prescriptive finding, it is also necessary for an
empowering statute to explicitly forbid the appearance of the
different-level appointing body before the tribunal. If a statute
allowed, or was silent, on the right of the appointing body to appear,
the appointing province might appear before the tribunal, which by
Lamer C.J.'s own prior reasoning, should result in a finding of
insufficient institutional independence.
Finally, the reductivist techniques employed by Lamer C.J. in
his formalist analysis, enable him to define the institutional
independence doctrine in deceptively simplistic methodological terms:
"We can examine the by-laws, apply the Valente principles, and reach
a conclusion." 127 The function of this objective entity, institutional

See the cases of MacBain, Sethi, Mohammad, supra note 64.

See section (ii) of this Pru·t 4(b), infra.
Sethi and Mohammad, supra note 64, as immigration cases, stand a much higher
chance of involving some degree of concern over s. 7 ( security of the person).
Regardless, both results upheld the sufficiency of independence of the
immigration board and adjudicators, respectively.

124
125

126

Matsqui, supra note 5 at 37.
Supra, note 66.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 39.

127

Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44. Sees. l(a).

Supra, note 45, s. 7.
The possibilities are: (i) security of tenure, security of remuneration and
appointment by a different level of government; (ii) appointment by a different
level of government; (iii) security of tenure and appointment by a different level;
(iv) security of remuneration and appointment by a different level; and (v)
security of tenure and security of remuneration.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 45.
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independence, which Lamer CJ. has promoted to a principle of natural
justice, is simple as well: "to ensure that a tribunal is legally
structured such that its members are reasonably independent of those
who appoint them." 128 There is no need for "reasonable apprehension"
in the rewritten test, as the wording will either pass muster or will not.
By-laws that fail on this analysis will violate principles of natural
justice. Viewed in this way, the concept of institutional independence
becomes, in effect, nothing more than a legislative drafting guideline,
ensuring adequate legal structure. The end result is too simplistic for
Sopinka J.

(ii) Sopinka J.' s Rejoinder
In contrast to the Chief Justice, Sopinka J. (with whom three
justices concur) does not range broadly over the topic, but narrows his
focus to the core of their disagreement - the role of context in an
analysis of institutional independence. Specifically, Sopinka J. looks
at the content of the term when applying the test for the apprehension
129
of bias as set out in Committee for Justice & Liberty. Lamer C.J.'s
failure to give appropriate attention to context is the basis of Sopinka
J. 's conclusion that restricting the institutional independence test to
the text of a by-law will leave the right-minded person uninformed.
Given the fact that at the time of the appeal no panel had been
appointed, nor any tenns of tenure or remuneration set, Sopinka J.
argues that no decision on institutional independence could, or should,
130
be made.
Two flaws make Sopinka J.'s analysis and critique of Lamer
CJ.' s reasoning less useful than it might otherwise have been. The
first flaw is his failure to elaborate on a major conceptual difference
with Lamer C.J. The second flaw, which pervades much of his
reasoning, is an inability or unwillingness to provide a solid definition
of "context."
Buried between paragraphs providing illustrations of cases
dealing with institutional impartiality and institutional independence,
Sopinka J. makes the following general statement:
128
129
130

Matsqui, ibid at 45.

Supra, note 66 at 394-395.
Matsqui, supra note 5 at 53.

INDEPENDENCE AFTER MATS QUI?

[11 C.J.A.L.P.]

137

... the relationship between impartiality and independence, even in the
traditional judicial context, is a close one .... The significance of the
theoretical distinction would appear to hold still less weight in the
131
administrative tribunals context.

Inexplicably, Sopinka J. fails to indicate that with this observation,
which he draws from Valente, 132 he is implicitly taking issue with the
foundation upon which Lamer C.J. has built his theory of a virtuallyautonomous "institutional independence doctrine," as well as with
much of Lamer C.J.'s earlier attempts to separate the two concepts as
founded in Lippe and Genereux. 133 The casual treatment of what
should be a fully-developed foundational argument is unfortunate.
Moreover, despite the fact that context is the concept central
to his analysis, Sopinka J. fails throughout to provide a single,
consistent definition of what the term means. Rather, a catalogue of a
dozen slightly-variant "definitions" and illustrations from cases are
supplied within four pages. 134 Thus, although context plays a central
role for Sopinka J. in determining whether there is a reasonable
apprehension of bias on the basis of insufficient institutional
131

132
133

134

Matsqui, ibid at 52.

Supra note 44 at 685.
Both cited as earlier authority by Lamer C.J. in support of his culminating total
separation of the two concepts in Matsqui. See notes 48-54 and accompanying
text.
See Matsqui, supra note 5 at 50-53. From Sopinka J.'s decision in Matsqui, we
learn that context, for example, might include how a tribunal operates in actual
practice (at 50); its contextual setting (at 50); the relevant, operational context (at
51); the actual context and operation of the office (at 51); the wider context
provided by a governing Act and the experience of self-governing professions
generally (at 51); the context of an actual hearing (at 52); the statutory scheme on
its face (at 52); the actual appointment terms, financial security and connection to
the executive branch of government for each of the individual lay members (at
52); the administrative policy respecting remuneration of tribunal members (at
52); whether a tribunal is actually constituted and the procedure of short listing
prospective tribunal members (at 52); the importance of both the scheme of the
legislation and how that legislation operated in practice (at 52); a range of
operational facts and circumstances including: the chain of command from the
Minister to the actual adjudicator, legal direction, monitoring, security of tenure,
the collective bargaining unit, transfer arrangements and scheduling of cases (at
53); knowledge of the operational reality of elements such as security of tenure
and remuneration that may be missing (at 53); and the practice of a tribunal as
depicted in the context of an actual hearing (at 53).
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independence, it remains an elusive tem1, susceptible to multiple
interpretations. It clearly widens the objective knowledge required
beyond the limitation imposed by Lamer C.J. However, the excessive
detail contained within Sopinka J.'s list makes it difficult to set a
standard. In the end, one does not have much confidence that a
hypothetical person, or for that matter, a decision-making body, has
sufficient information to ascertain a reasonable apprehension of bias.
(c) The Utility of the Reasoning in Matsqui: Will it Work

as an Analytical Tool?
The most cogent criticism of the reasoning of both Lamer CJ.
and Sopinka J. is that each fails to answer important questions. For
instance, with whom should we side when faced with an empowering
statute which is silent, incomplete or ambiguous in te1ms of the
Valente criteria? On the one hand, Lamer C.J. offers a fom1alist
method of analysis which is exceptionally easy to apply at a very early
stage, yet potentially fatal to the very existence of a number of
agencies. On the other hand, Sopinka J. offers a contextualist mode of
analysis which may allow a potentially flawed tribunal to make
decisions, before being challengeable on grounds of independence.
But he leaves one unsure of what context really is. Neither alternative
comforts.
The lack of any serious consideration of the remedial aspect of
their findings hobbles the reasoning of both Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J.
Arguably, this is due to their dealing with an issue which was not
considered in any depth in the courts below, and which was tangential
to the deciding issue in the result. However, the truncation of the two
justices' considerations may be particularly problematic if one is
looking to Matsqui for guidance.
In dealing with a tribunal established by subordinate
legislation, Lamer CJ. was, technically, justified in limiting his attack
to the principles of natural justice. No consideration was given in his
reasons, however, to how the fundamental tenets of legislative
supremacy and the presumption of constitutionality might impact on
tribunals established directly by statute. Arguably there was no need
for the Chief Justice to consider that. As he was willing to extend
himself as far into theory as he did, however, it should be incumbent
on him at least to indicate he was aware of a potential problem. In

139

view of the fact that he did not, and his consequently incomplete
"general field theory" of institutional independence, it might be best to
"read down" his statements in Matsqui. Perhaps they are best seen as
very strong recommendations on how the Valente principles of
judicial independence must find expression in subordinate legislation
establishing adjudicative tribunals. Meanwhile, the question of how to
. unanswere d .135
apply the th eory to statutory tn.b una Is must remam
Constitutionally, the reasons of both justices seem oddly
adrift. Neither analysis is grounded in the Constitution, the Charter, or
the Bill of Rights, thereby providing no indication how - or whether
- these texts might speak further to the issue of institutional
independence. Once again, it might be argued that it was unnecessary
to do so in this case. But by using s. 11 (d) of the Charter to introduce
the Valente principles, and obliquely alluding to security of the person,
Lamer CJ. left room for development. There was a missed
opportunity to characterize the interest at stake as either "the
enjoyment of property" or "the determination of rights and
136
obligations" as provided for in the Bill of Rights.
Still, there are a number of issues relating to bias on which a
137
clear majority of the Supreme Court agree. It is possible that, in
isolation, none of the above comments necessarily restrict Matsqui
from providing some guidance on the issue of tribunal independence.
But in view of the mutually contradictory positions developed by
Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J., the value of the case as a source for
understanding the nature of institutional independence must be
questioned.
The polls are obviously still open regarding Matsqui' s role on
the subject of institutional independence. No commentator has
sufficiently stressed the frustrating disutility of the standard set by
Lamer CJ.; nor has the paralysing nature of the disagreement between
138
Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. been observed. A trend common to the
135

136

137
138

Although, it seems that the analysis is performed in exactly the same fashion
- see Regie des pennis d' a/cool, supra note 36. The judgment was silent on
the question of whether there are any analytical differences between the two.
Sections l(a) and 2(e), respectively, of the Canadian Bill of Rights, supra note
124.
See Part 4, section (a)(i) of this paper, supra.
See P. L. Bryden, supra note 34 at 27-33 passim, 49-60; D.J. Mullan,
Administrative Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) (also Volume 3 of the Canadian
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academic commentary to date is either to treat the judgments in
Matsqui as unitary (effectively as the pronouncement of Lamer C.J.)
and incorporate them into the canon of administrative law, 139 or view
them as a set of positions from which one can draw what one wills. 140
Similarly, of two cases subsequent to Matsqui that employ its
41
reasoning, Katz1 effectively ignores the difference between Lamer
C.J. and Sopinka J.'s approach, though opting in the end for Sopinka
142
J.'s, while Bissett just opts for Sopinka J.'s approach without much
explanation.
These cases, concerning a provincial securities regulation
regime, and the federal labour regime respectively, are examined in
more detail below.
(i) Katz v. Vancouver Stock Exchange

The case involved a challenge to the disciplinary process set
out in the by-laws of the Vancouver Stock Exchange, authorized by
43
two British Columbia statutes, the Securities Ad and the Vancouver
144
Stock Exchange Act. Katz and others were charged with violating
provisions of the bylaws and Exchange rules. After a panel was
appointed by the executive committee of the Exchange to conduct an
Encyclopedic Digest series); and N. Des Rosiers, "Independence and impartiality
of administrative tribunals: Lessons in Listening" (Presentation to the members of
the Federal Court, September 1996 [unpublished on file with the authors]. Also, a
source that may be helpful but was unavailable at the time of writing is D. Ginn,
"Recent Developments in Impartiality and Independence" (1997) 11 C.J.A.L.P.
25.
139
140
141
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See Bryden and Des Rosiers, ibid.
See Mullan, Administrative Law, supra note 139 at 218.
Kat:: v. Vancouver Stock Exchange (1995), 128 D.L.R. (4th) 424, 14 B.C.L.R.
(3d) 66, 34 Admin. L.R. (2d) !., [ 1996] 2 W.W.R. 356 (C.A. per curiam). Appeal
to the SCC denied, see [1996] 3 S.C.R. 405, 41 Admin. L.R. (2d) l, 139 D.L.R.
(4th) 575, 207 N.R. 72.
Bissett \'. Canada (Minister of Labour), [1995] 3 F.C. 762, 102 F.T.R. 172
(T.D.). Reference can also be made to Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v.
Canada (labour Relations Board), [1996] 3 F.C. 609, 41 Admin. L.R. (2d) 49,
118 F.T.R. l (T.D.).

inquiry into allegations of contraventions of by-laws and Exchange
rules, but prior to the inquiry itself, the defendants requested a hearing
and review by the B.C. Securities Commission, 145 alleging lack of
institutional independence in the hearing panel. The Commission
rejected the argument of reasonable apprehension of bias, as did the
B.C. Court of Appeal. The appellant, Katz, relied primarily upon
Lamer C.J.'s holding in Matsqui in both fora, but at the Court of
Appeal, chose to allege a lack of institutional independence based
solely on the appointment of the chair of the hearing panel. A
unanimous panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal noted the
46
non-controlling nature of Lamer C.J.'s minority opinion in Matsqui/
and also distinguished Lamer C.J.'s test for institutional independence
on the facts of the case before them.
As in Matsqui, Katz involved a challenge to an alleged
structural flaw in delegated legislation that rendered the tribunal
insufficiently independent. The flaw manifested itself in a lack of two
147
"essential indicia of institutional independence" security of
tenure and remuneration - in that the by-laws provided for a hearingspecific panel composed of a lawyer member chair, paid on a per hour
basis, and two unpaid industry members. All members were chosen on
148
a rotational basis from a standing 44-member hearing committee.
The issue of administrative control was also argued, in that the lawyer
chair of the standing hearing committee, responsible for officially
appointing the hearing panel members, was in turn appointed by the
executive committee, the body responsible for initiating the hearing
process following potential violations by Exchange staff. Unlike the
process in Matsqui, these procedures were in place for some time 149
and had been used on a number of previous occasions, providing a
history and evidence of how the by-laws were implemented in
practice.

145
146
147

148

S.B.C. 1985, c. 83.
149

S.B.C. 1907, c. 62, as amended.

141

This was a right set out in s. 15 of the Securities Act.
Katz, supra note 141 at 426h.
Ibid. at 426.

In practice, the rotating list and the initial forwarding of potential names was
managed by a senior employee of the Exchange. The practice was not provided
for in the by-law.
Since 1991. See Katz, supra note 141 at 429c.
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The first thing to observe is the influence of Lamer C.J.'s
holding in Matsqui. All pai1ies, including the Securities Commission
and the Com1 of Appeal, accepted the analytical framework set out by
Lamer C.J. uncritically. The appellant framed his appeal by explicit
150
reference to the terms outlined by Lamer C.J.: both the Securities
Commission and the Court of Appeal delivered a significant portion of
their judgments in terms of the same (Lamer-enhanced) Valente
151
criteria.
The second central point to observe about the judgment is the
method by which each of the Securities Commission and the Court of
Appeal respond to the appellant's argument of a structural flaw based
on the Lamer CJ. test. In both cases, their analysis relies wholly on
evidence of practice and context, two terms central to the position
expressed in Matsqui not by Lamer CJ., but by Sopinka J. This is, in
fact, initiated by the appellants themselves prior to the Commission
hearing, where they requested "information as to the disciplinarY,
15
process, and, in particular, the process as it related to the appellant." The lengthy response by Exchange counsel outlined the composition
of the hearing committee, the history of selection of hearing panels
generally, and a chronicle of the selection of the hearing panel in the
instant matter. The appellant did not take issue with this statement,
and it was accepted as fact by both the Commission and the Court of
Appeal. It is impossible to reconcile this admission with the position
stated by the appellant in the appeal, which depends solely on Lamer
CJ.'s restriction of the test for institutional independence to the bare
wording of the relevant by-law:
1. The administrative scheme by which the Vancouver
Stock Exchange appoints hearing panels under its by-laws is
structurally flawed and does not meet the requisite level of
institutional independence as set out in Matsqui .... The Exchange
scheme neither provides security of tenure nor security of
remuneration, the two principle [sic J factors that must be considered

in determining whether the requisite
153
independence exists. [emphasis added]

151

152

153

Ibid., at 427.

lbid.1 at 429.

•

security of tenure: "any lack of formal security of tenure is
not a realistic threat to .. .independence."

•

security of remuneration: "nor is security of remuneration
a concern in these circumstances ... .it is irrelevant for
industry members .... [W]hile it is a theoretical possibility
that the Exchange could refuse to pay accounts of a
[lawyer] member whose decision was not considered
appropriate, this is not a practical concern."
administrative control: "by-law 5-20... makes clear that the
hearing panel has control of the proceedings once a
hearing begins ... [T]he appointment of hearing panel
members is the responsibility of the Chairman of the
hearing committee who is one of the lawyer members of
156
the committee."

•

155

Ibid., at 437d-h and 439a-g respectively. Unfortunately, it is even less rigorous
than Lamer C.J.'s own test. Notably absent is any reference back to the specific
wording of the by-laws of the Exchange. This is inexplicable under a detailed
reading of Lamer C.J.'s Matsqui criteria.

of institutional

Given this admission, it is perhaps not surprising that in making its
decision, the Commission took into account "the purpose and
responsibilities of the Exchange in disciplinary matters" and the
"evidence of the practice established for the appointment of hearing
committees." 154 What is surprising, however, is that the Commission
did not then go on to frame their rejection of the appellant's claim by
relating the evidence to the test as set out by Sopinka J. involving
155
considerations of purpose and practice.
The Commission next went on to examine each of the three
criteria of security of tenure, security of remuneration and adequate
administrative control. In finding that all three were indeed satisfied,
the Commission imposed Sopinka J. 's contextual analysis - although
without identifying it as such:

154
150

level

143

156

Ibid., at 427.
Ibid., at 435.

While not specifically citing the wider "purposive" approach developed by
Iacobucci J. in Pearlman among his dozen adumbrations of "context" in Matsqui,
Sopinka J.'s acceptance of the relevance of "wider purpose" falls clearly within
his stated area of implicit agreement with Lamer C.J. "Practice" is, of course, the
mainstay of Sopinka J. 's difference with the Chief Justice.
AllfromKatz,supranote 141 at437.
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The Court of Appeal, following the Commission below, also
felt it necessary to go on to illustrate how each of the three factors
were satisfied. Once again, they are dealt with in a manner clearly
consistent with the approach recommended by Sopinka J. and not
LamerC.J.:
157

•

security of tenure: "[ w ]hi le chairpersons ••• do not have
security of tenure based on any contractual rights or rights
found in the by-law, the practice over the last few years
demonstrates .... "

•

security of remuneration: "the evidence is clear that the
lawyer members submit their fee for services ... and these
fee accounts are paid as rendered. It is true that the lawyer
members do not have a written contract...and there is
nothing in the by-laws of the Exchange. Their right to be
paid ... must be presumed as a matter of law."

•

administrative control: "is also not contractually stipulated
or guaranteed in the by-laws but the evidence does not
suggest any interference in the process.... The practice
leads us to the conclusion that there is administrative
independence. " 158

This culminates in the Court unanimously finding that the legislation
and the by-laws of the Exchange, when taken along with the practice
of the tribunal, can be seen objectively to show that members of the
hearing panel are sufficiently independent. 159
The crucial thing to observe about the decision of the Court of
Appeal is that in the above passages, the Comt observes that the
panels indeed do fail - by the complete silence of the by-law - on
all three of the indicia of institutional independence set out by Lamer
CJ. Yet by imposing an analysis that is completely congruent with
that proposed by Sopinka J., without acknowledging this fact, the
court felt that it had sufficiently answered the question of institutional
independence. This misapplies the mutually contradictory approaches
set out by the two justices.
157

158
159
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At least two questions arise from Katz which are relevant to
the utility of Matsqui in examining institutional independence. First,
given the inability of not just the decision-makers, but also the
appellant himself, to confine an analysis to the bare wording of the bylaw, are we seeing evidence of how context exerts an inexorable
pressure and thereby forces its own consideration? Second, on what
basis, if any, may the factors specified by Lamer C.J. be satisfied by
advancing operational context evidence as suggested by Sopinka J.?
Neither question may be answered through recourse to the
reasoning in Katz. That the Court of Appeal felt obliged to set out at
great length 160 sections of both Lamer C.J.'s and Sopinka J.'s
reasoning in Matsqui, without once acknowledging their fundamental
disagreement, is in itself worrisome. That worry is only confirmed by
witnessing the ease with which Sopinka J.'s analysis is marshalled in
response to Lamer CJ., without any indication that a choice is being
made. The contextual approach clearly wins the day in Katz, 161 but the
final ruling is offered as if it satisfies both methods. While these
characteristics of Katz may be the result of sloppy decision-making on
the part of the appellate judges, they might equally indicate that
Matsqui provides no coherent guidance on dealing with the issue of
institutional independence. In effect, Lamer CJ.'s approach is
ignored. A pertinent question is whether this springs from the fact that
in Katz, the hearing panel procedure, set out by the by-law, had five
years of operational history. If this is so, it suggests the need to qualify
Lamer C.J.'s holding in Matsqui, it is not to be ignored entirely.
Perhaps it must be limited in its application not just to tribunals
established by subordinate legislation, but also only to tribunals that
. 1emente d.16'have yet to be imp

160

161

Recall that on appeal, the appellant reduced the allegation to lack of sufficient
institutional independence in the chair alone.

Katz, supra note 141at439.

Ibid.

145

162

Ibid. at 431-435. After setting out the headnote, Lamer CJ. is quoted at 432-433:
Sopinka J. at 433-435. The court merely observes that Sopinka J. adds
consideration of context, no mention is made of the implicit repudiation of Lamer
C.J.'s analysis. The Securities Commission indicated that they do not consider
Lamer C.J.'s holding as binding (at 426).
And conceivably much earlier, given the appellant's own failure to realize that
the evidence offered and accepted at the Commisison (supra notes 152-153 and
accompanying text) is itself expressive of something more than an approach to
the issue based on Lamer C.J.'s holding in Matsqui.
Given Lamer C.J.'s dissentient position on the issue of institutional
independence, the best fate might well be for it to be passed by as a curiosity.
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It may be that the same result would arise in Katz without
benefit of Matsqui, given the stress on context and flexibility in the
administrative arena in earlier cases like Lippe, Genereux, Sethi, and
Valente. This ignores the possibility, however, that the case itself
might not have been brought forward but for Matsqui. A cynical
reading of what Matsqui supplies, in light of Katz, could be that by his
formalist minimalism Lamer C.J. has merely provided an easy way to
challenge the adequacy of certain fora: what Sopinka J. has supplied,
in turn, is a similarly formulaic method of responding to that
challenge.
Katz was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada. In a one-paragraph judgment delivered by Iacobucci J. for the
full Court, the appeal was denied and the judgment of the British
163
Columbia Court of Appeal upheld. The Sopinka J. standard of
looking at the practice of the tribunal was adopted, without attribution,
and Matsqui was distinguished on context. As can be seen from the
judgment, quoted in its entirety below, no effort was made to explain
how context could satisfy (or oust) Lamer C.J. 's formalist criteria:
We agree with the British Columbia Court of Appeal that the
practi;e of the tribunal in question is one of the many factors to
consider in deten11ining whether the necessary degree of
independence is present to avoid creating a perception of reasonable
apprehension of bias. We also agree with the British Columbia Court
of Appeal that the situation in this case, particularly its selfregulatory context, is quite different from that which was present in
... Matsqui.
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Labour Code 166 was an adequate alternative to judicial review. In some
ways, the situation giving rise to the motions resembled the situation
in Matsqui. The applicant, faced with a decision by a Ministry of
Labour inspector, had a statutory right of appeal to a referee appointed
by the Minister of Labour. He instead applied for judicial review,
challenging the adequacy of the appeal procedure on the basis of
jurisdiction, insufficient institutional independence on the part of the
referee, and the alleged constitutional inability of the referee to review
the inspector's decision. Matsqui was relied upon in regard to the first
167
two issues. On both, the applicant failed: the referee was found to
possess sufficient institutional independence; furthermore the statutory
appeal procedure was an adequate forum in which to entertain
arguments and evidence regarding jurisdiction and all other issues.
168
•
Under authority of the Canada La.bour C od e, an mspector
issued payment orders totalling over $500,000 representing unpaid
wages, against the directors of a bankrupt corporation. Several of the
directors claimed to have resigned from the board of the corporation
prior to the dismissal of employees by the receiver; for this reason,
they argued, neither the Ministry of Labour inspector nor the referee
on appeal, had jurisdiction over them. In addition, in their application
for judicial review to the Federal Court, they challenged the
institutional independence of the inspector/referee regime:
As to the nature of the appeal body, the applicants say that the
referee does not have security of tenure, security of remuneration or
independence from the executive and is therefore not institutionally
169
independent, giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

164

(ii) Bissett v. Canada (Minister of Labour)

They also elaborated upon their argument regarding the particular
factor of administrative control:
The applicants' argument is not based on the particular individuals or
circumstances involved, but on the scheme of the legislation. They
say that the inspector is appointed by the Minister of Labour, as is
the referee. In their view, this brings into question the referee's

The issue in Bissett, a 1995 Federal Court, Trial Division
decision on two opposing motions for stays of proceedings, 165
concerned whether a statutory appeal to a referee under the Canada
163

164
165

Katz, supra, note 141.
166

Ibid.
167

One motion was for a stay of proceedings of an appeal to a referee under the
Canada Labour Code, the opposing motion was for a stay of proceedings of an
application for judicial review of the originating decision of an inspector for the
Ministry of Labour.

147

168
169

R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2, as amended.
Bissett, supra note 142 at para. 8.

Section 251.l ( l ).
Bissett, supra note 142 at 768.
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institutional independence.

While I cannot say that parliament could never establish a scheme
that might run afoul of the principle of institutional independence,
that is not a question of whether a referee in a specific case is an
adequate alternative to judicial review, having regard to the type of
considerations suggested by Lamer CJ. in Matsqui. It is an argument
that goes to the constitutional validity 175 of the referee provisions of
the Canada Labour Code ... [UJnlike [Matsqui] where the relevant
provisions were contained in what amounted to regulations, which,
as subordinate legislation, could be challenged under ordinary

171

172
173
174
175

common law principles of ultra vi res, here the provisions in issue are
176
contained in primary legislation.

170

Although it is not reported in the case, it is presumed that the inspector
is an employee of the Ministry of Labour, appointed under s.
171
25 I.12(1) of the Canada Labour Code . The Court noted that the
Canada Labour Code is silent on the issues of tenure and
remuneration. Guidelines are apparently distributed to referees with
172
their letter of appointment but were not provided to the Court.
The Ministry of Labour made two arguments in response.
First, that there was no evidence showing a lack of any of the three
criteria of security of tenure, security of remuneration, or
inappropriate administrative control. This argument, while clearly
incompatible with Lamer C.J.'s approach of looking at the wording of
the legislation alone, fit within Sopinka J. 's widened notion of context.
The second argument the Ministry made was that the dispute was
173
premature. Again, this argument is clearly compatible with Sopinka
J.'s approach in Matsqui.
Rothstein J. confirmed that Lamer C.J.'s reasoning in Matsqui
on the appropriate application of the adequate alternative remedy
174
applied. But he found any attempt to apply Lamer C.J.'s reasoning
on institutional independence to the case problematic:

170
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Ibid. at 771.

It is important to note Rothstein J.'s immediate default to Sopinka J.'s
approach. Rothstein J. had little difficulty in accepting the ar~ument
that, absent further evidence, it would be premature to decide the
question of institutional independence.
It is apparent to me, as it was to Sopinka J. in Matsqui, that it is not

appropriate to fonn a final conclusion at this early stage as to the
institutional independence of the referee on the basis only of a
consideration of the Canada Labour Code and the appointment
letter. Further evidence as to the nature of referee appointments, the
basis of remuneration and other relationships, if any, between the
referee the Minister and the inspector would be necessary in order
'
•
177
that a decision as to institutional independence be an mformed one.
Two aspects of how Matsqui was perceived in Bissett are particularly
relevant to any analysis and assessment of institutional independence.
First, Lamer C.J.'s formalist emphasis on the bare text of empowering
legislation leaves open the possibility of mistaking an instit.ut_ional_
independence challenge for a constitutional challenge to the vahd1ty of
the legislation. Second, the need to contextualize a challenge to a
tribunal's independence is explicitly expressed in Bissett, whereas in
Katz, it was only implicitly understood in the emphasis placed on
evidence and practice. In relation to the first point, the sufficiency of
Lamer C.J.' s approach even to subordinate legislation is thrown into
question by the result in Katz. The Sopinka J. approach appea~s to ~e
in the ascendant, and the importance of context, however defmed, 1s
fmther confirmed.
(iii) What Now?

It is important to remember that in Matsqui, Lamer C.J.,
Sopinka J. and four additional justices agreed on the need to separate
institutional independence and institutional impartiality. Katz and

Canada Labour Code, supra note 166. See Bissett, supra note 142 at para. 11.
Bissett, ibid. at para. 22.
Ibid. at para. 19.
Ibid. at para. 8.
This is certainly a debatable proposition, but beyond the immediate concern of
the current inquiry.

176

Supra note 142 at 77 L

177

Ibid at 773. The type of "further evidence" required for an informed decision
described here by Rothstein J. closely resembles the list drawn by Sopinka J.
from his characteriza.tion of Mohammad (supra note 64) in Matsqui, supra note 5
at 53.
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Bissett confirm that this division will continue to be accepted, even in
the absence of a clear articulation of the two concepts. These two
subsequent cases also demonstrate that Lamer C.J.'s and Sopinka J.'s
different evaluative criteria introduce what almost certainly is a lessthan-productive attempt to square the circle by driving decisionmakers to look first at the bare wording of an enabling regulatory
scheme, in deference to Lamer C.J., then to examine its context and
practice to satisfy Sopinka J. So far, it appears that Lamer C.J.'s
criteria will be subsumed in Sopinka J.'s. This would certainly not
violate Lamer CJ.'s earlier admonition to be flexible! But beyond
this, Lamer C.J.'s approach would seem to have little to recommend it.
The very nature of the contradiction presented by the two
vying positions on institutional independence, in combination with the
incompletely grounded nature of the reasoning, undermines the
authoritativeness of Matsqui. As was apparent in Katz, Lamer C.J.'s
approach in Matsqui ce11ainly offers a tidily restrictive framework, yet
one which can easily be employed in ways other than intended.
Whereas Sopinka J.'s approach, basically an insistent reminder of the
relevance of context and practice, delivers little beyond a pragmatist's
caution against excessive theoretical fugue, a call not to wander too far
off into abstract and conceptual theory.
Given the thesis concerning the internal flaws in the two
approaches in Matsqui, it is likely that this situation will continue. The
case will likely be further mined as support for various propositions
concerning bias and its components, impartiality and independence. In
the occasional case concerning institutional independence, a "mixand-match" approach will be taken towards the judgments of Lamer
C.J. and Sopinka J. Despite being the most significant statement on the
issue of institutional independence by the Supreme Court, the holdings
in Matsqui will do nothing to settle the academic debates concerning
independence of administrative tribunals. This need not have been so,
had Lamer C.J. also attempted to ground his theory more closely in the
practical realities under which tribunals operate, or if Sopinka J. had
focused his treatment of context and practice as necessary
components, and provided a much more ample response in terms of
his difference with Lamer CJ. In the end, Lamer CJ.'s restrictive
criteria will probably not affect the "revolution" referred to by
178
Bryden, nor will it, except in isolated cases of tribunals newly
178

See Bryden, supra note 35 at 49.
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established under subordinate legislation, serve to alter the structure of
many tribunals. Despite this, though, Matsqui will always present a
tempting ground for litigants to challenge tribunals. However, its
internal flaws - in logic, consistency and lack of grounding - will
prevent successful understanding of institutional independence.

5. CONCLUSION
It is evident from the foregoing that the issue of institutional
independence concerns virtually all actors in the administrative arena
- from the Supreme Court to academe, and from the Native tax
assessor to the Privy Council. What is also evident from the justices of
our highest court is that their divergent opinions concerning the
necessary and sufficient indicia for independence - are they the
words of the by-law? The operational context? - make it necessary to
construct tribunals carefully.
In R. W. Macaulay's 1989 study of Ontario regulatory
agencies, he observes that
[a] number of structural adjustments are needed to the agency system
in order to improve its performance overall. These touch on the
amalgamation or elimination of agencies, program evaluation,
sunsetting, appointments, tenure, remuneration, training, a code of
conduct and conflict of interest, the relationship between agencies
and ministries, the authority of the chairperson and public access.
The major obstacle to needed structural changes for agencies is the
lack of consensus regarding their goals and reasons for initial
179
creation.
180

Macaulay, unlike Lamer CJ. in Matsqui, makes no attempt to
unduly stress one component, such as tenure or remuneration, over
another. Note also that he describes all components as "structural"
elements of "the agency system." Macaulay, it is contended, made a
wiser choice of words than whoever first joined the term
"institutional" to "independence" and "impartiality." Tenure,
remuneration, and administrative control (that is, the possession of
179

R.W. Macaulay, Directions: Review of Ontario's Regulatory Agencies (Toronto:
Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1989), Overview, at 15.

180

Drawing of course, from the line of cases beginning with Valente (supra note
46), in which Dickson C.J. first offered the court's own mirror up, somewhat
ambiguously, to tribunals.
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one's own process) are, indeed, elements of the structure of tribunals.
The other elements mentioned by Macaulay are also elements of that
structure. If these are poorly served, it may well be that independence
•
181
suffers as much as by any absence of tenure or remuneration.
Macaulay draws attention to the lack of consensus regarding not just
182
the goals of the tribunal system, but the very reason for its creation.
Given the prescriptive enthusiasm of Lamer C.J. in Matsqui, any
reasonable observer might assume the tribunal system was created
simply to generate a number of small, imperfect courts.
In extending the specific criteria from Valente into the realm
of tribunals such as the Native assessment appeal boards, Lamer C.J.
fails to take account of a host of pragmatic difficulties attendant in the
creation of such agencies. Before insisting on abstract principles like
secure tenure and sufficient remuneration, he would have been well
advised to turn his mind, however informally, to a number of
questions beyond even the operational context advised by Sopinka J.
In general terms: How many appeals might actually arise in a year?
What is the appropriate salary for a tribunal member? What quantum
will likely make them independent? What quantum will not? Is a year
a long enough period of tenure? Is seven years too long? And
specifically in the Matsqui case: At what point, given the potential tax
base in the reserve, does the cost of an appeal tribunal exceed the taxes
collected? Will tribunal members, assured of position and pay, be
unaware that too many judgments against a native band will make
them cost-ineffective? At what point should bands throw up their
hands and collapse the system into an appeal to the Federal Court,
Trial Division only? Will this provide more or less opportunity to
appeal an assessment? For whom? How will appealing every contested
assessment (for those with deep enough pockets to do so) encourage
aboriginal self-government? It might be said that these are not
properly Lamer C.J.'s concerns. He simply needs to ensure that a
tribunal functions sufficiently like a judicial analogue to satisfy his
181

Murray Rankin, for example, in "Perspectives on the Independence of
Administrative Tribunals" (1993) 6 C.J.A.L.P. 91at97, has observed that
[n]otwithstanding the trappings of independence, however, the Cabinet of
course has the power to appoint individuals to the agencies, and its indirect
but obvious control over the pursestrings may constrain any potential
independence on the part of the boards.

182

Or, more properly, its continuous haphazard growth.
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concept of the "doctrine" of institutional independence, not whether
the tribunal can or does work. On the other hand, the insufficiency of
Sopinka J.'s response to Lamer C.J.'s sterile formalism makes it
difficult to discern whether his more pragmatic and functional
approach would itself open outward to the concerns expressed above.
In almost every study and report prepared on the topic of
independent agencies, it is noted that a significant number use part183
time members. This single statistic is perhaps one of the most
important when examining the need for independence:
Independence ... seems to be affected by at least two factors. First,
many agency members are part-time appointments. Being paii-time
means that these people do not rely solely upon their position as an
agency member for their livelihood. They can, therefore,
theoretically afford to take an independent approach to their parttime job and to resist any attempts by Government to influence their
individual case decisions .... Some will not want to see that income
lost on the altar of independence but clearly their dependence upon
184
agency-related income is far less than that of a full-time employee.

It is, therefore, the appointment process and fonn of member
employment that become issues of paramount importance. Although
patronage might seem to pertain more to impartiality than
independence, its prevalence makes it a structural, even systemic,
problem. This is a major deficiency in the Valente criteria. Failure to
oust a tainted appointment process should be as equally egregious as
lack of agency control of their own processes. Lamer C.J. 's Diceyan
adherence to a delimited set of criteria, themselves a response to the
operational context assessed in Valente, is, in the end, entirely
arbitrary.
The chasm between Lamer C.J. 's theoretical, yet restrictive,
approach and Sopinka J.'s less-than-rigorously-defined "operational
context" approach impedes, for the foreseeable future, development of
a more coherent analysis of the issue. Although six justices did
manage to agree on a number of factors, these factors cannot be used
to any proper effect without agreement on the proper direction to take.
If this can eventually be achieved, it would be best that the justices
183
184

As presumably the native band tribunals were.
Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, Agencies, Boards and Commissions:
The Administrative Justice System in Nova Scotia (Discussion Paper) (Halifax,
N.S.: Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, 1996) at 62.
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attend more closely to the many voices, past and present, that have
illuminated the essential nature of tribunals - the non-court aspects
of administrative decision-making. In the meantime, as the pragmatic
and functional approaches bleed through the strict doctrinal theory, it
would be the lesser of two evils for the courts to favour the approach
taken by Sopinka J. in Matsqui.

